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6Synopsis
The study empirically examines the investment value of analyst recommendations on
constituent stocks of the S&P/ASX 50 index. For the period from 30 June 1997 to 30
October 2007, we find that stocks with favourable consensus recommendations
(“strong buy” and “buy”) on average earn a higher return than the market, whereas
stocks with unfavourable recommendations (“strong sell” and “sell”) earn a lower
return. An investment strategy using the Black-Litterman asset allocation model that
overweights (underweights) stocks with favourable (unfavourable) consensus
recommendations, in conjunction with daily rebalancing, outperforms the market in
terms of raw return and risk adjusted performance measures. The investment strategy
involves high levels of trading and, as a result, no significant abnormal returns are
achieved after accounting for transaction costs. Less frequent rebalancing, under most
situations, causes a decrease in both performance and turnover. Filtering of dated
recommendations causes an increase in turnover, whilst having mixed effects on
investment returns.
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The Investment Value of Australian Security Analyst Recommendations:
An Application of the Black-Litterman Asset Allocation Model
1. Introduction
Security analysts form an important part of financial markets. They provide stock
recommendations and earnings forecasts for their clients who rely on their research to
make investment decisions. Analysts gather large amounts of economic, industry and
firm-specific information to perform prospective analysis on listed companies, and
identify discrepancies between the intrinsic value and market price of securities. In
making a stock recommendation, analysts explicitly express their opinion about the
relative performance of an individual company compared to the market. As Elton,
Gruber & Grossman (1986) observe, stock recommendations represent “one of the
few cases in evaluating information content where the forecaster is recommending a
clear and unequivocal course of action rather than producing an estimate of a number,
the interpretation of which is up to the user.” The question that we seek to examine in
this paper is whether investment strategies based on analyst recommendations are
profitable to investors?
On the one hand, the semi-strong form of market efficiency posits that investors
should not be able to trade profitably on the basis of publicly available information
(Fama 1998), such as analyst recommendations. On the other hand, “the survival of
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analysts in a repeat game framework seem to suggest that their ability to efficiently
process information is a valuable service to clients and is reason to suspect that in
doing so they introduce new information to the market” (Fabre & Snape 2007).
Research departments of brokerage houses spend large sums of money on security
analysis in the attempt to generate higher returns for their clients (Barber Lehavy,
McNichols, & Trueman 2001). The 1999 Reuters Survey of Australia and New
Zealand identifies broker research as the most important factor in the allocation of
brokerage commission, and the majority of institutions have a formal system for
measuring and rewarding brokerage research and service (Aitken, Muthuswamy, &
Wong 2000).
The possibility that profitable investment strategies could be formed on the basis of
analyst research are suggested by the findings of Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996),
whose event studies around analyst recommendation announcements show that
favourable (unfavourable) recommendations are accompanied by positive (negative)
abnormal returns and post-announcement price drifts in the same directions. Barber et
al. 2001) study the investment value of analyst research by empirically testing the
profitability of calendar-time portfolios constructed on the basis of consensus analyst
recommendations. They construct portfolios of stocks with favourable and
unfavourable consensus recommendations and show that a gross abnormal return of
over 4% p.a. could be made by buying (shorting) the most (least) favourably
recommended groups. However, persistent debates prevail about potential conflicts of
12
interest in the analyst recommendation process and its impact on investors.
Investment banks and brokerage firms are the primary producers of security research.
They distribute investment advice in the form of earnings forecasts and security
recommendations with the intention of generating brokerage income from investors
while at the same time attracting corporate investment banking clients. Boni &
Womack (2002) find that existing and potential investment banking relationships
influence the judgement of analysts. Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische & Lee (2004) find that
analysts from sell-side firms are more inclined to recommend “glamour” stocks
(growth stocks with high trading volume), because these firms also tend to be widely
held by the institutional clients who place trades with brokerages. Growth stocks also
make attractive investment banking clients. In Australia, the Australian Securities and
Investment Commission (ASIC) govern the dissemination of analyst
recommendations to help prevent market manipulation, and misleading and deceptive
conduct. The risks of adverse reputation and legal prosecution, to a certain degree,
dissuade analyst bias and limit potential distortion from manipulation.
This study examines the profitability in following the course of action recommended
by security analysts on stocks in the S&P/ASX 50 Index. Constituents of the
S&P/ASX 50 Index are amongst the largest and most liquid stocks trading in the
Australian stock market, and are heavily covered by analysts. Consequently, their
pricing should be relatively efficient. Our empirical motivation is to test the
investment value of security analyst recommendations for these stocks and the
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efficiency of the Australian market in response to these recommendations. We take a
calendar-time approach to measure the profitability of various implementable
investment strategies. These strategies are mainly based on consensus
recommendations of stocks, as they incorporate the information implied by all
analysts with outstanding coverage. A calendar-time approach allows the direct
evaluation of gross abnormal returns, and to estimate the turnover and associated
transaction costs of the investment strategies. As a result, analysis could be made as to
net profitability of investment strategies. By examining whether investors can profit
after trading costs, we contribute to the debate on market efficiency. Assessing the
investment value of analyst recommendations is an ideal way to test whether it is
possible to profit abnormally using publicly available information (as opposed to
studies on corporate events), because security analyses are carried out with the
explicit purpose of improving investment performance (Barber et al. 2001).
We contribute to the existing literature in the following ways. This study is the first to
empirically assess the investment value of analyst recommendations using the
calendar-time approach for the Australian stock market. In contrast to the US, where
recommendations are released to the public shortly after its simultaneous release to
clients, recommendations in Australia are not released instantaneously to all clients
(Aitken, Muthuswamy & Wong 2000). The staggered release in Australia may result
in different abnormal returns and a prolonged price discovery process. Secondly, we
are the first to apply the Black-Litterman asset allocation model to incorporate real
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life analyst recommendation data and evaluate its performance in calendar-time.
Unlike a simple strategy, which buys or sells portfolios of covered stocks based on
consensus recommendations, the Black-Litterman approach is a more realistic
portfolio management strategy, which measures the performance of the weight
adjusted market portfolio based on expected relative performance of different stocks.
Finally, we examine the effect of transaction costs, infrequent portfolio rebalancing,
filtering of dated outstanding recommendations and variations of input parameters to
the Black-Litterman model on investment performance
The results show that, stocks with favourable consensus recommendations on average
outperform stocks with unfavourable recommendations. An investment strategy using
the Black-Litterman asset allocation model that overweights (underweights) stocks
with favourable (unfavourable) consensus recommendations, in conjunction with
daily rebalancing, consistently outperforms the market in terms of raw return and risk
adjusted performance measures. It also outperforms the favourably recommended
consensus groups of stocks. This investment strategy involves high levels of trading
and no significant abnormal return can be achieved after accounting for transaction
costs. Less frequent rebalancing, under most situations causes a decrease in both
performance and turnover. Filtering of dated recommendations causes an increase in
turnover, while creating mixed effects on investment returns.
This research is of interest to finance academics, and practitioners. From an academic
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perspective, the study contributes to a better understanding of analysts’ abilities as
processors of financial information, and the efficiency of the market in incorporating
the information content of analyst recommendations. From the perspective of industry,
it assesses the usefulness of analyst recommendations in investment decisions, and
profitability of trading on them using various strategies. Finally, brokers issuing the
recommendations have a vested interest because they spend large amounts of
resources to produce them with the intention of generating commissions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of
the relevant literature regarding analyst recommendations and the Black-Litterman
model. Section III describes the data used in this study. The research design and
methods are explained in Section IV. Section V presents the results, and examines
impact on them by varying our investment strategies. We end the paper with a
conclusion in Section VI.
2. Relevant Literature
This section provides a review of relevant literature covering the background of
analyst recommendations research, the calendar-time performance of analyst
recommendations and the Black-Litterman asset allocation model. A table that
contains annotations of main references used by our study is presented in Appendix A.
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2.1 Background Literature of Analyst Recommendations
There has been wide-ranging literature on the impact and value of brokerage analyst
recommendations dating back to the seminal work of Cowles (1933). The motivation
for Cowles’ (1933) research is to examine the success of applied economics in
investment decision making, by assessing the stock selection and market timing
ability of security analysts in financial service firms, insurance firms, Wall Street
Journal editorials and other financial publications. He finds that on average the
recommendations issued by analysts perform poorly against the market. Cowles (1944)
re-examines the recommendations of eleven of the financial publications and finds
evidence of more favourable performance, but still concludes that they do not have
predictive ability. However, the survival of equity analyst research on stock markets
since Cowles (1933) seminal work seems to suggest that they provide value to clients
and as a result trading commissions for brokerages. In fact, a large number of prior
studies find the information that security analysts produce promotes market efficiency
by helping investors to more effectively evaluate investment opportunities. Schipper
(1991) and Brown (1993) provide a comprehensive review of analyst literature in this
area. Ramnath, Rock & Shane, (2008) develop a taxonomy of research examining the
role of financial analysts in capital markets, which builds on the foundation provided
by Schipper (1991) and Brown (1993), and focuses on more recent literature. Section
4 of Ramnath et al. (2008) review the literature about ‘analyst and market efficiency’
and is of particular relevance to this study. Literatures that consider the effectiveness
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of analysts in processing publicly available information, and whether the market
incorporates recommendation information efficiently are reviewed in more detail
below.
A significant amount of literature focuses on analyst recommendation revisions for
stocks in the US, documenting price reactions and subsequent performances of
recommendation changes. Stickel (1995) examines a sample of 17,957
recommendations from Zacks Investment database to test the hypothesized factors
influencing the price reaction to recommendation revisions. In studying the
performance of security analysts he finds that buy (sell) recommendations issued by
brokerages influence share prices favourably (unfavourably). The magnitude of price
impact from recommendation changes is positively related to the strength of the
recommendation, the magnitude of change, the reputation of the analyst, and the
marketing ability of the brokerage. The effect of the analyst recommendations also
depends on the information environment, and whether contemporaneous earnings
revisions are being released. Specifically, the author finds that smaller companies
have greater price reactions to recommendation revisions than larger companies, and
recommendations issued contemporaneously with a same-sign earnings forecast
revision have greater price impact.
Past researches into brokers’ recommendations focusing predominately on price
impact generally find that recommendations have permanent price impact, which
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suggests that security analysts have predictive ability. Womack (1996) and Elton et al.
(1986) shows firms receiving buy (sell) recommendations tend to earn higher (lower)
abnormal returns. Elton et al. (1986) also demonstrate that consensus
recommendations perform better than individual ones. Womack (1996) records large
share price reactions at the time of the recommendations, even though few
recommendations coincide with public news or provide previously unavailable
information. They document post-recommendation stock price drifts, which Womack
finds to last up to one month for upgrades and six months for downgrades. The larger
and more sustained reaction for sell recommendations suggest that the market does
not fully incorporate the information in them.
Internationally, Jegadeesh & Kim (2006) examine analyst recommendations in the G7
countries and find that stock prices react significantly to recommendation revisions on
the day of recommendation and on the following day in all of the G7 countries except
Italy. They find that stock prices drift up and down for upgrades and downgrades
respectively over the next two to six months, and “is most prominent in the US,
followed by Japan indicating that the value of analyst recommendations is the largest
in these countries”.
Ball, Brown & Finn, (1978) study recommendations on Australian stocks published in
two financial journals and find that abnormal returns are highest in the months leading
up to the announcement of the recommendations. They find smaller returns in the
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month of the announcement but no evidence of abnormal returns in the
post-recommendation period. This suggest that the recommendations under
examination have only minimal information content and price impact as they are
mostly impounded before the recommendation releases. Finn (1984) examines the
information content of recommendations produced by the in-house analysts of a
financial institution in Australia and finds the price movement of the stocks to be
consistent with the direction of the recommendations. The most significant evidence
of abnormal returns is found in the first month after a recommendation. There is an
average cumulative abnormal return of -3.56% for sell recommendations, whereas for
buy recommendations it is +1.11%. The author also finds that “where the direction of
earnings forecast and a recommendation are in conflict, the opportunity to earn excess
returns is in line with the recommendation”.
Aitken, Muthuswamy & Wong (2000) study the impact of stock recommendations in
the Australian equity market and finds that stocks issued with a buy-type
recommendation experience positive price impact but partial price reversal
subsequent to the announcement day, sell-type recommendations have a permanent
impact on prices and stocks receiving hold recommendations exhibit negative
pre-recommendation returns but positive post-recommendation returns. Given the
evidence of significant abnormal returns, the authors suggest that the recommending
brokers have stock picking ability. Abnormal returns in the pre-recommendation
period are however observed to be higher, which the authors attribute to three possible
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explanations: 1) brokers may not be as skilful in their timing ability, 2) they may be
reactive rather than pro-active in recommending stocks, 3) there may be information
leakage to select clientele or front running by proprietary traders. The authors also
find evidence of significant increases in trading volume around the issuance of analyst
recommendations.
2.2 Calendar-time Performance of Analyst Recommendations
Our study is related to a paper in the Journal of Finance by Barber, Lehavy,
McNichols & Trueman (2001) – “Can Investors Profit from the Prophets? Security
Analyst Recommendations and Stock Returns”. Barber et al. (2001) document the
potential to earn higher returns by buying the most highly recommended stocks and
short selling the least favourably recommended stocks. Their methodology is different
from the event-time approach of prior researches (Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996)),
which measure the price reaction to changes in individual analysts’ recommendations.
Event-time analyses used in Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) assess the magnitude
of mispricing that analysts detect when they revise their recommendations. However,
as Barber et al. (2001) points out, Stickel and Womack’s event time analysis does not
examine the profitability of analyst recommendations on an implementable
investment strategy. In Barber et al. (2001), portfolios containing covered stocks with
different consensus analyst recommendations are constructed. Portfolios of stocks
with favourable (unfavourable) consensus recommendations are bought (sold). They
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document significant abnormal returns of 4.13% (4.91%) per year by purchasing
(shorting) stocks with favourable (unfavourable) recommendations, after controlling
for market risk, size, book-to-market, and price momentum. They also find that the
level of abnormal performance depends on fast reaction to recommendation changes
and frequent portfolio rebalancing. However, after accounting for transaction cost, the
abnormal returns become statistically insignificant. Despite this, the authors suggest
that analyst recommendations remain valuable to investors who are otherwise
considering trading.
Similar results are found for recommendations issued by fee-paying investment
advisory services and investment newsletters. Choi (2000) finds evidence that Value
Line recommendations exhibit performance beyond what is predicted by existing
models of expected return. Similar to Barber et al. (2001) once transactions costs are
accounted for, abnormal returns become insignificant. Jaffe and Mahoney (1999)
examine the performance of investment newsletters and find that they do not on
average outperform their relative market benchmarks.
Barber et al. (2002) study the returns to analysts’ stock recommendations over the
1996-2001 period. During this time analysts appear to become increasingly involved
in the investment banking side of their business and the investment value of
recommendations issued by them deteriorates. The authors show that the more highly
recommended stocks earn greater market-adjusted returns during the 1996-99 period
22
than those less highly recommended. However, during 2000 and 2001, the least
favourably rated stocks earn the highest returns, whereas the most favourably
recommended stocks perform the worst. The poor performance of analyst
recommendation prevail during most months of 2000 and 2001 and is robust for both
tech and non-tech stocks.
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee, (2004) show that stocks more favourably
recommended by analysts, on average, outperform stocks less favourably
recommended by them. Like Jegadeesh et al. (2004) implement the strategy of buying
the most favourably recommended quintile of stocks and shorting the least favourably
recommended quintile of stocks, and find that this strategy yields positive abnormal
profits. However, they suggest that analysts do not fully take into account various
stock characteristics in making their decisions, and the direction of the bias is in line
with economic incentives of sell-side firms. They find that analysts from sell-side
firms generally recommend “glamour” stocks, which have positive momentum, high
growth, high volume, and are relatively expensive and that recommendation level
based strategy profits largely from the price and earnings momentum, rather than
from the recommendations’ predictive ability. According to the authors, this bias in
recommendations is because growth firms and firms with higher trading activity make
for more attractive investment banking clients. These firms also tend to be widely
held by the institutional clients who place trades with the brokerage houses. Jegadeesh
et al. (2004) document the average analyst rating over the 1985 to 1999 period to be
23
close to a “buy”, and sell-type recommendations make up less than five percent of all
recommendations.
This is consistent with Lin & McNichols (1998), Michaely & Womack (1999) and
Boni & Womack (2002), whom also show that existing, and potential, investment
banking relationships affect analyst decisions. Despite inherent biases extant literature
have generally found that analyst recommendations do add value (e.g. Stickel (1995)
and Womack (1996) document that recommendation upgrades tend to more
favourable price impact than downgrades, and Barber et al. (2001), Jegadeesh et al.
(2004), Boni and Womack(2003) and Green (2006) find that stocks with favourable
recommendations outperform stocks with unfavourable ones). They indicate that
investors can still benefit from analysts’ recommendations if they focus on the relative
levels of recommendations and their revisions.
Mikhail, Walther, & Willis (2004) and Li (2005) investigate whether security analysts
exhibit persistence in their stock picking ability and find that analysts whose
recommendation revisions earn the most (least) excess returns in the past continue to
outperform (underperform) in the future. Li (2005) suggests that more information is
contained in above-median performing analysts’ recommendations and investor
reaction to this information is incomplete. Mikhail et al. (2004) find that the market
does not fully recognize these performance differences, and excess returns in the one
and three trading months following the revision are significant and positively
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associated with analysts’ prior performance. A trading strategy that takes long (short)
positions in stocks experiencing recommendation upgrades (downgrades) conditional
on an analyst’s prior performance generates excess returns, but is insufficient to cover
transactions costs.
The profitability of trading on analyst recommendations depends on the fast reaction
to recommendations revisions. Green (2003) finds evidence that early access to stock
recommendations provides brokerage firm clients with incremental investment value.
After controlling for transaction costs, purchasing (selling short) following upgrades
(downgrades) result in average two-day returns of 1.02% (1.50%). Short-term profit
opportunities persist for two hours following the premarket release of
recommendation changes. The gradual price response is in contrast to Busse & Green
(2002), who find that profit opportunities dissipate within seconds following the
televised broadcast of analyst recommendations. According to Green (2003), a
calendar-time based strategy produces annualized returns of over 30%, and the results
are robust during both bull and bear markets. By focusing on the short-term
informational advantage of brokerage firm clients and carefully controlling for trading
costs using intraday transaction data, Green (2003) finds evidence that analyst
recommendations do contain investment value. The results indicate that the
performance of recommendations based investment strategies, such as those in Barber
et al. (2001), Boni & Womack (2003), and Jegadeesh et al. (2004), may be
significantly enhanced by transacting quickly following recommendation changes.
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The profitability of trading on analyst recommendations also depends on transaction
costs. Anand, Badrinath, Chakravarty & Wood (2006) examine the empirical question
whether the release of analyst recommendations generate additional information
asymmetry that would cause the widening of bid-ask spreads, and hence increase
execution costs around such events. They analyze changes in spreads, depth and
trading activity around recommendation changes on NYSE and AMEX listed
securities, by examining 5,863 revisions. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that
spread will widen around the release of recommendations due the adverse selection of
information associated with analyst reports, Anand et al. (2006) find that transaction
costs do not increase around analyst recommendation changes. In fact, the stability of
spreads, combined with the increased depth and volume around these changes actually
increase liquidity. The authors attribute this result to the presence of contrarian traders
willing to transact against analyst advice. Irvine (2003) finds similar results when
studying the incremental price and liquidity impact of analyst initiation (the first time
an analyst makes a recommendation on a firm) over continued coverage. He finds that
analyst following enhances liquidity.
Fabre & Snape (2007) study the liquidity surrounding sell-side equity analyst
recommendation revisions on the Australian Securities Exchange. Over a sample of
10,959 recommendation revisions, they find analyst recommendation revisions to be
liquidity enhancing events. Transaction costs do not increase from the release of new
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information embedded in the recommendations. Instead, bid-ask spreads (as proxies
of transaction cost) remain unchanged, whereas trading volume and depth increase.
This evidence suggests that the market is sufficiently liquid to process new
information without changes in transaction costs.
2.3 The Black-Litterman Asset Allocation Model
Our study assesses the investment value of analyst recommendations using the
calendar-time portfolio approach for the Australian stock market. In addition to the
trading strategies used in Barber et al. (i.e. long favourably recommended stocks and
short unfavourably recommended stocks), we apply the Black-Litterman asset
allocation model to construct our portfolio and incorporate analyst recommendations
as investor views. We will review the relevant literature here.
In the field of quantitative asset allocation, Markowitz (1952) leads the way with his
seminal work on portfolio mean-variance optimization. Under Markowitz’s portfolio
optimization framework, the notion of risk reduction through diversification is given
rigorous mathematical justification.
In a standard portfolio optimization problem, the inputs are expected returns of the
“N” different assets expressed by a (N×1) matrix “r” and the covariance between
them expressed by a (N×N) matrix “Σ”. Both “r” and “Σ” are assumed to be known,
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and are used to solve for the optimal weighting of assets within the portfolio
represented by “w”, an (N×1) matrix. Therefore the expected return of a portfolio and
its risk can be express as:
( ) 'pE r w r and 'p w w  
Markowitz assumes that investors have a quadratic utility function towards risk and
return.
1' '2U w r w w  
The optimal asset allocation of a portfolio is found by maximizing investor utility by
varying the weighting of each asset.
1max ' '2w w r w w 
U r ww
 

   => 1( )w r  
As risk aversion of the investor changes the optimal mean-variance combination
changes, thus resulting in a set of optimal portfolios, which make up the efficient
frontier. When a risk free rate of return is introduced, only one optimal portfolio (the
tangency portfolio) exists, and leverage of the portfolio is used to adjust for risk
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aversion.
Although theoretically appealing, the model has failed to gain popularity amongst
industry practitioners. This is due a number of the model’s practical weaknesses,
which often result in unintuitive and highly skewed portfolio allocations. Firstly,
Markowitz’s theory requires, as inputs, the expected returns and the expected
variance-covariance structure for all assets in the investment universe. Yet, an investor
typically has opinions about only some of the assets in that universe, resulting in poor
estimates of expected return inputs to the model. Secondly, asset weighting decision
under the optimization process is highly sensitive to the input assumptions. The
unreliable estimation of required inputs coupled with the model’s high sensitivity to
them often lead to unreasonable results (Drobetz 2001).
The Black-Litterman asset allocation model is a sophisticated portfolio optimization
method that addresses the problem of unintuitive, highly-concentrated portfolios,
input-sensitivity, and estimation error maximization – the three main reasons
suggested by Idzorek (2004) for the breakdown of Markowitz’s mean-variance
optimization in practical applications. It is developed by Fischer Black and Robert
Litterman during their time at Goldman Sachs as in house portfolio management
paper. It is expanded in Black & Litterman (1992) and then published in the Financial
Analysts Journal and is discussed in greater detail in Drobetz (2001) and He &
Litterman (1999).
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The Black-Litterman model combines the CAPM (Sharpe 1964), reverse optimization
(Sharpe 1974), mixed estimation (Theil 1971), and mean-variance optimization
(Markowitz 1952). It uses a Bayesian approach to overcome the practical issues in
using the Markowitz framework by allowing the portfolio manager to express their
own views regarding the performance of various assets with the market equilibrium in
a manner that results in intuitive, diversified portfolios. The Black-Litterman model
allows the incorporation of both absolute views (expected rate of return) and relative
views (outperforming vs. underperforming) with various degrees of confidence on the
selected assets. The adjusted returns resulting from the investor’s view and the
covariance between the assets, then serve as a consistent input for the performance of
mean-variance optimization.
In our case, the opinions and views are represented by analyst recommendations.
Black and Litterman starts with a benchmark portfolio. The natural choice for the
benchmark portfolio is the market portfolio (since it could clear the market if all
investors hold homogeneous views). The expected returns of constituent assets should
be the equilibrium implied expected returns derived from reverse optimization,
assuming that the market portfolio is efficient (Drobetz 2001). The Black-Litterman
model gravitates towards the neutral (i.e. market capitalization weighted) portfolio
and tilts in the direction of assets favoured in the views of the investor. It starts with
the market weights; reverse optimized to find the equilibrium implied rates of
30
expected return. The rates of return on some assets are then adjusted to reflect the
view of the investor. The mean-variance optimization is then performed with the
revised expected returns to generate adjusted weighting of assets. The extent of
deviation from equilibrium depends on the degree of confidence the investor has in
each view.
The Model Itself:
Black and Litterman (1992) offer a model to incorporate investor's views into
asset-pricing. Unlike Markowitz’s mean-variance optimization, Black-Litterman
assumes the current market capitalization weightings are optimal in absence of
investor opinion, and reverse optimizes it to find the equilibrium implied rate of
return:
marketw  
The investor can then incorporate her personal views and confidence intervals about
expected returns into the model to adjust the market cap implied rate of return.
( )P E r q  
Given the views of the investor the mean and variance of expected return can be
written as:
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1 1 1 1 1( ) [( ) ' ] [( ) ' ]BLE r P P P q 
    
      
1 1 1( ) [( ) ' ]BLVar r P P
  
   
where
( )BLE r is the new (posterior) Combined Return Vector (N x 1 column vector)
τ is the shrinkage factor for the covariance matrix;
Σ is the covariance matrix of excess returns (N x N matrix);
P is a matrix that identifies the assets involved in the views (K x N matrix );
Ω is a diagonal covariance matrix of error terms from the expressed views
representing the uncertainty in each view (K x K matrix);
Π is the equilibrium implied return vector (N x 1 column vector); and,
Q is the view vector (K x 1 column vector).
In order to calculate the optimal weights for the portfolio the mean variance
optimization is now repeated using the revised expected returns as inputs:
1max ' ( ) '2BLw w E r w w  subject to ' 1w l 
where l is an (n×1) matrix of ones
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Figure 1: An Intuitive Derivation of the Black-Litterman Asset Allocation Model
Assume Market Capitalization
Weightings to Be Efficient
optimal marketw w
Revised Expected Returns Adjusted for Investor’s Views and Confidence
1 1 1 1 1( ) [( ) ' ] [( ) ' ]BLE r P P P q 
    
      
Perform Mean-Variance Optimization to find the
Black-Litterman Portfolio Weights
Investor’s Views on the Expected
Returns of Selected Assets and
Degree of Confidence
Expressed as a Matrix of Absolute
and Relative Opinions
( )P E r q  
Distribution of Equilibrium
Implied Rated of Return
( , )N  
Calculation Equilibrium
Implied Rated of Return
marketw  
Distribution of Investor’s Opinion
on Asset Performance
( , )N q 
Distribution of Adjusted Rate of Return
 1 1 1( ),[( ) ' ]BLN E r P P
  
  
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3. Data and Index Background
3.1 Index Background
The investment universe of this study is the S&P/ASX 50 Index. The S&P/ASX 50 is
Australia’s most prominent large cap equity index, representing 50 of the largest and
most liquid index-eligible stocks listed on the ASX by float-adjusted market
capitalization (Standard and Poor’s). In order to be eligible for inclusion in any of the
S&P/ASX indices stocks must meet certain criteria: listing, size, liquidity, free float.
The constituent companies must be listed on the ASX, maintain adequate market
capitalization over the previous six month, have a public float of at least 30% for
issued stocks and are actively and regularly traded (Standard and Poor’s).
Constituents are rebalanced quarterly to ensure that the criteria are adequately met by
using the previous six months’ worth of data. Quarterly rebalancing changes take
effect on the third Friday of March, June, September and December. When there is a
change in the composition of the S&P/ASX 50 index, our portfolio is adjusted to
reflect its constituents.
3.2 Data
Two sets of data are used for this study – Security Analyst Recommendations and
Stock Price Performance. Security analyst recommendations are made by financial
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institutions on stocks listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Stock
performances are calculated by using price data for the stocks for our sample period.
3.2.1 Recommendations Data
The analyst recommendations data in this study come from the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database (now part of Thomson Reuters). I/B/E/S’s
extensive historical data presents a unique opportunity for testing investment
strategies based on analyst recommendations. The recommendation data used for this
study is from brokerage houses in Australia. The relevant period analyzed will be
from 30 June 1997 to 30 October 2007. I/B/E/S provides a Summary File containing
consensus recommendations as well as a Detail Recommendations File containing
analyst-by-analyst recommendations for all individual updates and revisions.
Although analysts from different brokerages can have different investment ratings,
I/B/E/S standardizes the recommendations by establishing its own rating system – a
rating of 1 reflects a strong buy recommendation, 2 a buy, 3 a hold, 4 a sell, 5 a strong
sell and 6 for termination of coverage. When a contributing analyst sends in a
recommendation, it is mapped onto one of I/B/E/S’s ratings. This normalized file
structure is commonly used by recommendation databases, and allows flexible
updates and manipulation of the data. Consensus analysts’ recommendations are
calculated from the I/B/E/S Detail Recommendations File by simply averaging the
normalized ratings of outstanding recommendations. In the Results Section, we also
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explore the effect on investment performance of filtering dated recommendations
from the consensus recommendation calculation, by applying a time cut-off to
outstanding recommendations.
The dataset arrives in the form of an international analyst database encompassing all
non-US recommendations. Recommendations are identified as Australian by home
market codes. The data consists of three individual datasets; a broker identification
file, a recommendation file and an initiation of analyst coverage file. To administer
this data, a remote mySQL server is set up to get the data into manageable format and
programs are written to sort and analyze them to produce descriptive results and
generate daily trade lists for portfolio rebalancing. This results in a dataset that
includes the recommended firms ASX code, the raw and adjusted analyst
recommendations, date the recommendation was made, and the analyst / firm issuing
it. The recommendation day for our analysis is defined to be the announcement date
recorded by I/B/E/S, which is the day that recommendations are officially released to
a broker’s clients.
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Table 1
Year
Average
Estimator
per Covered
Stock
Average
Covered
Stock per
Estimator
Percentage
of
Coverage
Average
Rating
1 2 3 4 5 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
30/6/97 - 30/6/98 10.53 32.12 89.7% 2.45 27.7% 19.4% 41.0% 4.8% 7.1% 11.5% 74.2% 14.4%
1/7/98 - 30/6/99 11.24 25.27 92.7% 2.42 28.2% 20.5% 43.0% 2.9% 5.4% 20.0% 64.0% 15.9%
1/7/99 - 30/6/00 11.06 23.42 94.6% 2.15 34.3% 25.3% 34.7% 2.2% 3.5% 37.6% 57.7% 4.7%
1/7/00 - 30/6/01 12.38 23.14 94.6% 2.28 30.5% 21.9% 42.3% 1.7% 3.6% 23.1% 69.6% 7.3%
1/7/01 - 30/10/02 13.26 24.48 93.5% 2.24 31.2% 21.3% 42.6% 1.7% 3.2% 23.7% 73.3% 3.0%
31/10/02 - 30/10/03 11.28 21.47 97.8% 2.40 20.2% 29.1% 43.5% 4.2% 3.1% 14.9% 74.2% 10.9%
31/10/03 - 30/10/04 10.18 22.31 97.7% 2.50 17.1% 26.9% 47.3% 4.6% 4.1% 10.4% 77.2% 12.4%
31/10/04 - 30/10/05 10.33 23.59 97.7% 2.48 18.7% 25.6% 47.8% 5.1% 2.8% 10.8% 78.8% 10.4%
31/10/05 - 30/10/06 10.66 21.99 99.4% 2.55 19.0% 22.8% 47.0% 7.2% 4.0% 8.5% 75.2% 16.3%
31/10/06 - 30/10/07 11.07 20.69 100.0% 2.54 19.5% 23.8% 45.0% 8.3% 3.3% 14.3% 66.3% 19.5%
30/6/97 - 30/10/07 11.20 23.85 95.8% 2.40 24.6% 23.7% 43.4% 4.3% 4.0% 17.5% 71.1% 11.5%
Buy:Sell 5.84
Discriptive Statistics of Analyst Recommendations for S&P/ASX 50 Index Constituent Stocks from 1997 to 2007
Individual Recommendation Distribution Consensus Group Distribution
This table presents the summary statistics of the recommendations dataset used in this study. Estimators referred to in the second and third
columns are brokerages or investment banks that provide the recommendations on the stocks. Percentage of coverage shows the proportion of
S&P/ASX 50 stocks that are covered by analyst (i.e. have outstanding recommendations) in a given period. Individual recommendation
Distribution shows the percentage of “strong buy”, “buy”, “hold”, “sell” and “strong sell” recommendations outstanding in a given period.
Consensus Group Distribution shows the percentage of covered stocks with consensus recommendations falling into Group 1 (1 2A  ),
Group 2 ( 2 3A  ) and Group 3 ( 3A  ).
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There are 13,332 recommendation changes during our sample period for the
constituents of the S&P/ASX 50 Index. In our dataset, buy-type signals outweigh
sell-type signals by approximately 5.84:1. This coincides with Wong (2002) who finds
a higher propensity for Australian analysts to make “sell” and “hold”
recommendations over their international counterparts. Stickel (1995) calculates the
ratio for U.S analysts as 7:1. According to Aitken et al. (2000), theory that has often
been put forward to explain the imbalance between buy, hold and sell
recommendations is that brokers are reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations
on companies with which they have a potential or ongoing corporate relationship.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the recommendation dataset used in this
study. Overall, “strong buy” recommendations account for approximately 24.6% of all
recommendations during this period, while “buy” recommendations account for
approximately 23.7% and “hold” recommendations 43.4%. “Sell” and “strong sell”
recommendations make up only 8.3%. On average, 17.5% of stocks during this period
had a consensus rating between “strong buy” and “buy”; 71.0% of stock fell between
“buy” and “hold”, while 11.5% of stocks had a consensus rating between “hold” and
“strong sell”
The average percentage of stocks under coverage is 95.8% and that figure has steadily
increased to nearly 100% at the end of the sample period (Column 4 of Table 1). This
is consistent with the conventional wisdom that indexed firms are heavily covered by
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analysts, because they are more liquid and widely held by institutional investors. This
means that they tend to be heavily traded and publicized, which in turn would
generate substantial brokerage commissions for the sell-side analysts’ firms.
From 30 June 1997 to 30 October 2007, the mean number of estimators (brokerages)
per covered stock has remained relatively constant at around 11, while the mean
number of covered stocks per estimator has gradually decreased from 32 to 21. This
seems to suggest that the number of brokerages contributing to the recommendation
database has steadily increased, while each covers a smaller number of index
constituents. Column 5 of Table 1 shows that the average level of analyst
recommendations has generally remains steady around a mean of 2.4, which is
between a “buy” and a “hold”. During financial years 2000 to 2002 the average
recommendation level is at its most favourable - approximately 2.2, or close to a buy.
In recent years, however, analysts have become more prudent with issuing favourable
recommendations. As a result the average outstanding recommendation is closer to
2.5 and the end of the period. This is possibly a correction to the overly optimistic
forecasts which are made during the financial years 2000 to 2002. During this period
the most favourably recommended stocks underperform the market while the least
favourably recommended stocks outperform. This is consistent with Figure 6 which
shows the cumulative market adjusted return consensus recommendation portfolios.
The cumulative abnormal returns of Portfolios 1 and 3 during the period converge
towards zero. This follows Barber et al. (2002) which found that analyst
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Table 2
1 2 3 4 5 Dropped Total
1 223 293 1,107 21 36 573 2,253
100 84 128 95 139 231 16.90%
2 381 308 1,496 65 43 530 2,823
98 57 102 111 97 170 21.17%
3 1,025 1,532 423 540 439 1,079 5,038
107 91 63 103 121 172 37.79%
4 21 69 509 64 26 142 831
82 81 70 21 60 84 6.23%
5 30 27 475 26 16 126 700
153 90 77 179 66 195 5.25%
Dropped 305 440 730 101 58 53 1,687
59 9 7 3 30 2 12.65%
Total 1,985 2,669 4,740 817 618 2,503 13,332
14.89% 20.02% 35.55% 6.13% 4.64% 18.77% 100.00%
Median Interval Between Recommendation Transitions 103 Days
Mean Interval Between Recommendation Transitions 192 Days
To Recommendation of
Transition Matrix of Analyst Recommendations on S&P/ASX 50 Index Constituent Stocks
(Count and Median Interval) from 30/6/1997 to 30/10/2007
From Recommendation
of
This table shows the median number of days between changes in or reiterations of analyst recommendations issued on S&P/ASX 50 Index
constituent stocks. Each row represents the recommendations that have changed from a 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (sell), 5 (strong sell),
6 (dropped), while each matching column shows the transition of the recommendations to 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (sell), 5 (strong
sell), 6 (dropped). Fractional recommendations and median number of days are rounded to the nearest integer.
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recommendations performed poorly during 2000-2001 across both tech and non-tech
stocks.
Table 2 is a transition matrix of recommendation updates for constituents of the
S&P/ASX 50 Index during our sample period. Each cell (f : t) contains two numbers.
The top one is the number of observations in which an estimator has updated its
recommendation on a certain stock from f to t. The bottom number is the median time
interval between the announcement of a recommendation and when it is updated. The
diagonal elements of the transition matrix represent reiterations. Entries above the
diagonal represent recommendation downgrades while entries below the diagonal are
recommendation upgrades. The transition counts are more concentrated on the third
row and column due to the large number of hold recommendations in our sample.
Analysts’ tendency to issue “buy” and “hold” recommendations rather than “sells” is
reflected in the concentration of observations in the upper left 3 x 3 range. The mean
interval between recommendation updates is 192 days, while the median interval
stands at 103 days. This reflects the tendency of some analysts to leave their
recommendations unchanged for long periods of time causing the distribution to be
positively skewed. In our sample, there is no apparent difference in the time it takes to
revise or reiterate an outstanding recommendation.
The average seven day cumulative market adjusted abnormal return on
recommendation updates are reported in Table 3. The results are similar in nature to
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Table 3
1 2 3 4 5 Dropped Total
1 223 293 1,107 21 36 573 2,253
0.1194% -0.4432% -0.2617% -0.1632% -0.0085% 0.3470%
2 381 308 1,496 65 43 530 2,823
0.2749% -0.2057% -0.3791% 0.3444% -0.4856% 0.3740%
3 1,025 1,532 423 540 439 1,079 5,038
0.4986% 0.6114% -0.2054% -0.7205% -0.2495% 0.1224%
4 21 69 509 64 26 142 831
-0.5720% 0.1188% 0.7629% 0.3715% -1.1912% -0.0203%
5 30 27 475 26 16 126 700
1.0272% -1.4836% 0.3922% -0.5333% -0.5273% -0.3658%
Dropped 305 440 730 101 58 53 1,687
0.4401% 0.2596% 0.0034% -0.1166% -0.3586% -4.0108%
Total 1,985 2,669 4,740 817 618 2,503 13,332
Weighted Average Cumulative Abnormal Return for Recommendation Upgrades 0.16%
Weighted Average Cumulative Abnormal Return for Recommendation Downgrades -0.11%
Seven Day Cumulative Market Adjusted Return Matrix of Analyst Recommendations on S&P/ASX 50 Index
Constituent Stocks (Count and Mean) from 30/6/1997 to 30/10/2007
To Recommendation ofFrom
Recommendation of
This table shows the percentage market-adjusted returns measured for the week (including the announcement day) following the release of the
recommendation changes or reiterations. Each row represents the recommendations that have changed from a 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold),
4 (sell), 5 (strong sell), 6 (dropped), while each matching column shows the transition of the recommendations to 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3
(hold), 4 (sell), 5 (strong sell), 6 (dropped). Fractional recommendations and median number of days are rounded to the nearest integer.
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those of Stickle (1995) and Womack (1996), whose event study approach found
positive (negative) abnormal returns following analyst upgrades (downgrades). Most
upgrades (downgrades) show positive (negative) market adjusted abnormal return,
except for (4:1), (5:2), (2:4), which had a very small number of observations. Overall,
the weighted average 7 day cumulative abnormal returns for upgrades and
downgrades are 0.16% and –0.11% respectively.
3.2.2 Price Data
To measure and track the performance of the portfolio of stocks under examination,
we use historical return data sourced from the Securities Industry Research Centre of
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). These prices are used to calculate any abnormal returns on
portfolios constructed following analyst recommendations.
We measure the total return of portfolios (including capital gains and dividend returns)
over the period from 30 June 1997 to 30 October 2007 by using the accumulation
share price. Like an accumulation index, this is the price assuming all dividends are
reinvested into the share value. Therefore, all dividends and stock splits (including
bonus share issues and other dilution of share value by way of issuance) are accounted
for. This in effect gives the accumulated total return for an investment in a stock.
In this study, we assume all trades are executed at the closing price, but test the
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robustness using different execution strategies. The execution assumptions are
described below:
1) Daily closing price
All trades are assumed to be executed at the closing price for that trading day.
Therefore, the accumulation closing price for all S&P/ASX 50 constituent stocks is
used for every trading day.
2) Daily Volume Weighted Average Price – VWAP
VWAP is calculated by summing the dollars traded for every transaction (price
multiplied by number of shares traded) and then dividing by the total shares traded for
the day.
PrNumberOfSharesTraded Share ice
VWAP
TotalNumberOfSharesTraded



3) Daily VWAP for buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated trades
All buy orders are executed at the accumulated VWAP of all buyer-initiated trades for
that day, and all sell orders are executed at the accumulated VWAP of all
seller-initiated trades for that day. Buyer-initiated (Seller-initiated) trade is defined as
any trade that occurs at a price above (below) the mid-price of the bid-ask spread
prevailing in the non-overlapping market just prior to a trade.
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: PrBuyerInitiatedTrades NumberOfShares Share ice
BuyerInitiatedVWAP
BuyerInitiatedTotalNumberOfShares



: PrSellerInitiatedTrades NumberOfShares Share ice
SellerInitiatedVWAP
SellerInitiatedTotalNumberOfShares



4. Research Design
This section presents the methods used to implement our recommendation based
investment strategies and measures their performances over time. The first part
describes the method for creating portfolios containing stocks with different
consensus recommendation levels. This is followed by the methods that are used to
evaluate performance and calculate turnover. The application of the Black-Litterman
asset allocation model is then discussed in detail.
4.1 Consensus Recommendation Portfolio Construction
To assess the investment value of analyst recommendations in Australia, we construct
calendar-time portfolios based on the consensus recommendations of stocks. In
addition to measuring the abnormal performance of portfolios of stocks with
favourable and unfavourable consensus recommendations relative to the market, we
apply these abnormal performance figures as investor views to the Black-Litterman
asset allocation model to examine the profitability of trading on analyst
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recommendations in a portfolio optimization context. The investment universe for this
study is the constituent stocks of the S&P/ASX 50 Index. The estimation period for
relative performance is from 30 June 1997 to 31 October 2002. The relative
performance figures then form the inputs to the Black-Litterman model’s view matrix
for the period from 31 Oct 2002 to 30 Oct 2007.
Our definition of a consensus recommendation 1itA  is the simple average of
recommendations for stock i on date t-1. It is calculated by adding all outstanding
recommendations 1ijtA  (j represents individual recommendations) together and
dividing by n (the number of outstanding recommendations):
1
1
1
1
itn
ijt
j i
it
it
A
A
n







Covered stocks are grouped into three different consensus recommendations
portfolios depending on a stock’s average rating, on a daily basis. The first portfolio
includes stocks most favourably recommended by security analysts, for which the
consensus recommendation is between a “strong buy” and a “buy” 1 2A  . The
second portfolio contains stocks with a consensus recommendation between a “buy”
and a “hold” 2 3A  . The third portfolio comprises of the least favourably
recommended stocks for which the consensus is between a “hold” and a “strong
sell” 3A  . The arbitrary cut-off for each consensus recommendation level is set so
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that Portfolios 1 & 2 would contain stocks with favourable consensus
recommendations of “strong buy” to “hold”, while Portfolio 3 would contain stocks
with unfavourable consensus recommendations of “hold” to “strong sell”. Since buy
recommendations are more often issued than sell recommendations the consensus
group is further separated into two groups. Due to the limited number of stocks and
analyst recommendation observations, the consensus portfolios are not further
separated into quintiles as in Barber et al. (2001). Doing so causes an absence of
stocks from certain quintiles for extended periods of time.
The consensus recommendation of a stock is recalculated every time an outstanding
recommendation is revised and when coverage of a stock is initiated or terminated. As
the consensus recommendation of a covered stock changes, it moves between
consensus groups. The portfolios are rebalanced on a daily basis at the close. The
stocks in the consensus recommendation portfolios are held proportional to their
market capitalization. That is a covered stock’s weight in its consensus portfolio is
calculated by dividing its market capitalization by the total market capitalization of
the portfolio. There are two reasons for holding a value weighted portfolio of stocks
rather than an equally weighted portfolio. Firstly, in a portfolio context, companies
should be held in proportion to its market capitalization if investors have
homogeneous views. Secondly, to maintain the equally weighted portfolio of stocks
the rebalancing trades would generate excessive amount of turnover and transaction
costs as stock prices change. In a market capitalization weighted portfolio, the value
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of the firms and stock price change proportionally, hence reducing the need for
rebalancing.
To measure the performance of our portfolios, the weighted average returns of the
respective portfolios are calculated:
1
1
1
p tn
p t i t i t
i
R w R



 
1itw  is the market value of equity for firm i as of the close of trading on date t - 1
divided by the aggregate market capitalization of all firms in portfolio p as of the
close of trading on that date,
itR is the return on the common stock of firm i on date t, and
1ptn  is the number of firms in portfolio p at the close of trading on date t -1
To find the return for a period of interest, the daily rebalancing returns are
compounded:
1
(1 ) 1
n
pT pt
t
R R

  
4.2 Performance Evaluation
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To evaluate the profitability of investment strategies with respect to analyst
recommendations we apply three main performance measurements, namely the
market adjusted rate of return, the Sharpe Ratio and the Sortino Ratio. The market
adjusted rate of return is the focus of our performance evaluation, since with the
Black-Litterman asset allocation model results in a weight adjusted market portfolio
to reflect analyst opinions. Furthermore, Brown & Warner (1980) evaluate various
method of measuring stock price performance and find that the market adjusted return
performs well under a wide variety of conditions, and there is no evidence to suggest
that more complicated methodologies convey any benefits. It is given by pT mTR R
for portfolio p in month T, where mTR is the S&P/ASX 50 Accumulation Index’s
return in month T. Sharpe ratios and Sortino Ratios are calculated to account for the
difference in the level of volatility and downside risk of each of the portfolios.
The Sharpe Ratio, developed by William F. Sharpe, measures risk adjusted
performance of an investment portfolio. The Sharpe ratio is calculated by subtracting
the risk-free rate from the portfolio return and dividing it by the portfolio standard
deviation. The greater a portfolio's Sharpe ratio, the higher the amount of excess
return for every unit of risk. It is represented as follows:
pT fT
pT
R R
SharpeRatio



where
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pTR is the rate of return achieved by the portfolio,
fTR is the risk free interest rate, and
pT is the standard deviation of the portfolio
The Sortino ratio, developed by Frank A. Sortino, measures the downside-risk
adjusted return of an investment portfolio. It differentiates between upside and
downside volatility, and only penalizes those returns falling below a pre-specified
benchmark (the risk free rate of return), whereas the Sharpe ratio penalizes both
upside and downside volatility equally. Therefore the Sortino Ratio provides a risk
adjusted measure without penalizing variability in upward price changes. The Sortino
ratio is characterized as follows:
pT fT
pT
R R
SortinoRatio
DR

  
1/2
2( ) ( )f
R
fDR R x f x dx

 
where
pTR is the rate of return achieved by the portfolio,
fTR is the risk free interest rate, and
f() is the probability distribution function of the returns, and
DR is the down side risk of the portfolio calculated from a sequence of historical
returns x, the root mean square underperformance U, where fTU x R  if
0fTx R  , otherwise U = 0.
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4.3 Turnover and Transaction Cost
The investment strategies utilized in this study are all active portfolio management
strategies. As a result they require frequent rebalancing and high levels of trading in
order to be executed effectively. To determine the costs that are incurred as a result of
our trading, the turnover of the portfolios needs to be measured. At the end of every
trading day, portfolio stocks are rebalanced, at their closing price. The difference in
constituent stocks or weightings between day t-1 and day t gives us the trades that
needs to be executed to rebalance the portfolios in accordance to recommendation
updates. The value of shares bought and sold for a portfolio on day t should be equal.
Turnover for portfolio p during trading day t is defined as the percentage of the
portfolio’s holdings that has been sold (the proceeds from which are used to buy other
shares) as of the close of trading. That is the percent of the portfolio that has been
“turned over” into some other set of stocks.
The net profitability of a trading strategy depends critically on the amount of
transaction cost it incurs. Transaction cost could be classified as explicit and implicit.
Explicit transaction cost may include brokerage commissions, while implicit
transaction cost mainly involves market impact cost. Gallagher & Looi (2003) studied
market impact cost incurred by active equity funds managers in Australia. They
estimate that, on average, active fund managers incur a market impact cost of 0.27%
for a round trip trade package. In this study, we assume this to be market impact
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component of our transaction cost. The increase in liquidity of an individual stock
around recommendation announcements documented by prior studies may cause the
market impact cost for consensus recommendation portfolios to be slightly
over-estimated. This, however, would have little effect on the Black-Litterman
portfolio, because the view matrix changes the weighting for all stocks. The explicit
component of transaction cost is assumed to be 0.2% for a round trip transaction. The
two components of transaction cost sum to 0.47%. This figure is then applied to the
turnover figure to estimate transaction costs incurred by our trading and to calculate
the net returns of the portfolios.
4.4 Application of the Black-Litterman Asset Allocation Model
As mentioned earlier, the primary method for evaluating the investment value of
analyst recommendations in this study is an application of the Black-Litterman asset
allocation model. The objective is to assess the profitability of an investment strategy
that adjusts the weighting of the index constituents in accordance to analyst
predictions. This section of the study briefly describes the intuition of the
Black-Litterman Model. Particular focus is given to the details of combining market
equilibrium expected returns with “analyst recommendations” to generate a new
vector of expected returns. The Black-Litterman asset allocation model, created by
Fischer Black and Robert Litterman, uses a Bayesian approach to combine the
subjective views of the investor on the expected performance of one or more assets
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with the market equilibrium implied rate of return of the portfolio to form an update
set of return estimates. To implement this trading strategy, we start with a market
weighted neutral portfolio and assume that it is optimal if all market participants have
the same expectations. It is then reverse optimized to produce the equilibrium implied
rate of return. These returns are changed to incorporate information from analyst
recommendations. This posterior distribution of asset returns will then be the input for
portfolio optimization, which leads to intuitive asset allocation and reasonable
weights.
4.4.1 Reverse Optimization
The Black-Litterman model uses equilibrium implied rates of return as the prior
distribution of asset returns, which serve as a starting point to incorporating “analyst
views” about future performance. If no views are expressed by the investor, the
resulting optimum portfolio should be the neutral portfolio. Black & Litterman (1992)
define the neutral portfolio as one that could clear the market if all investors held
identical views – the market portfolio. This study assumes an investment universe of
the constituents of the S&P/ASX 50 Index and uses it as our neutral portfolio. This
could be expanded to include a wider range of stocks and assets. The true market
portfolio, which should include all assets, is impossible to indentify or construct (Roll
1977). The equilibrium returns for assets in our portfolio are derived using reverse
optimization, where the set of returns implied by market weights are calculated by
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multiplying the investors risk aversion, and the covariance matrix of the assets with
their market weights:
marketw  
Where
 is the equilibrium implied excess (above the risk free rate) return (N x 1 vector)
 is the risk aversion of the investor
 is the covariance matrix of excess returns (N x N matrix)
marketw is the market capitalization weight of portfolio constituents (N x 1 Vector)
The covariance matrix is calculated on a daily basis using return data from the past 3
months. We use this time frame because the index constituents change every quarter
and there is a limited amount of price data on hand. The 3 month bank accepted bill
rate (continuous maturity) is used as the risk-free rate of return in all excess return
calculations and optimization procedures.
4.4.2 Risk Aversion
The risk aversion coefficient represents the trade-off between risk and expected return.
It can be viewed as a scaling factor in both the reverse optimization and optimization
processes. The higher the risk aversion, the greater the excess return required to
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compensate for per unit of risk, which in turn will increase implied rate of return in
the reverse optimization and reduce the asset allocation’s sensitively to excess return
in the optimization process. The implied risk aversion coefficient ( ) for a market
can be estimated by dividing the long term expected excess return by the variance of
the portfolio (Grinold & Kahn 1999):
2
( )m f
m
E r R




where
( )mE r is the expected market (or benchmark) total return;
fR is the risk-free rate; and,
2
m is the variance of the market (or benchmark) excess returns.
Dimson, Marsh & Staunton (2003) estimate Australia’s long term average market risk
premium to be around 8% p.a. Using their estimate, we calculate the risk aversion of
investors in Australia to be approximately 3. Idzorek (2004) estimates the risk
aversion using for the global market to be 3.07, and uses 3 for his Black-Litterman
model. Drobetz (2001) also uses a risk aversion of 3 for a study based on the Dow
Jones STOXX indices for European sectors over the period from June 1993 to
November 2000.
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4.4.3 View Expression
Investors are now able to incorporate their personal views and confidence levels about
expected returns into the model to adjust the market weight implied rate of return. To
translate the consensus analyst recommendations into the views of the portfolio
manager, we have to assume relative percentages outperformance (underperformance)
for stocks with favourable (unfavourable) consensus recommendations compared to
the market. We track the performance of the three portfolios formed on the basis of
consensus analyst recommendations to estimate the relative performance of these
stocks against the market, and then use them as the input to construct the view matrix
in the Black-Litterman asset allocation model. In this study, the time from 30 June
1997 to 31 Oct 2002 is used as an estimation period to estimate the long-term
abnormal performance of stocks receiving favourable and unfavourable
recommendations relative to the market. From 31 Oct 2002 to 30 Oct 2007, we apply
the relative performance figures generated in the estimation period to construct an
optimized portfolio, which incorporates the long term abnormal returns as a view
matrix into the Black-Litterman model. It is assumed that the average over and under
performance of consensus recommendation portfolios relative to the market remains
constant through time.
Views of the Black Litterman model could be expressed in either relative or absolute
terms. For example, one can express the view that stock A will outperform Stock B by
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5% p.a. or that stock C will return 10% p.a. In the present study, views of relevant
consensus recommendation portfolios in this study are expressed in relative terms
against the market portfolios. They are expressed in the following form:
( )P E r Q  
where
P is a matrix that identifies the assets involved in the views (K x N matrix ),
Q is the view that includes the relative performance figures (K x 1 column vector),
 is an error term associated with the uncertainty of the investor’s view.
The model does not require the investor to have a specific view on all assets. In this
case, all covered stocks with outstanding consensus analyst recommendations will be
included in the view matrix. Specifically, we express three views:
1) Portfolio 1 outperforms the market by Q1 bps per trading day,
2) Portfolio 2 outperforms the market by Q2 bps per trading day, and
3) Portfolio 3 underperforms the market by Q3 bps per trading day.
To achieve this relative performance against the market, one would long the
respective consensus portfolio and short the market. Therefore the P matrix would
take positive positions in the constituents of a consensus portfolio weighted by their
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market capitalizations relative to the portfolio’s market capitalizations, and then short
all the constituents of the index weighted by their market capitalizations relative to the
aggregate value of the index.
This is an example, where on a certain trading day assets 1 and 2 falls into Portfolio 1;
assets 3 and 4 falls into Portfolio 2 and assets 5 and 6 falls into Portfolio 3. Note that
assets can move into different portfolios each day due to changes to consensus. Their
weights in respective views are equal to their market capitalization weights in the
consensus portfolios (for the first view, 1pW is equal to asset 1’s market cap divided
by the sum of Asset 1 and 2’s market cap), minus their weights in the index ( 1mW is
equal to Asset 1’s market cap divided by the index market cap).
1 1 2 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 5 6 6 7
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 
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3
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


 
 
 
 
  
The uncertainty of the view results is represented by the error term  , which is
normally distributed random variable, with a mean of zero. The variances of the error
terms are represented by the  matrix, which acts as a proxy for confidence. The
matrix is a diagonal matrix of variances of each view that is expressed by the investor.
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Once Matrix P is defined, one can calculate the variance of each individual view
portfolio. The variance of an individual view portfolio is 'k kP P , where k is the
number of views being expressed. According to Idzorek (2004) the respective
variance of each individual view portfolio is “an important source of information
regarding the certainty, or lack thereof, of the level of confidence that should be
placed on a view”. In this study, we do not express our subjective confidence on each
of the views, but allow the confidence to vary with the variance of the view portfolio.
Thus in volatile times, we would put less weight on the relative performance views,
and reduce the investment departures from market weights, whereas, when view
vector variances are low, the portfolio weights will be tilted more aggressively due to
the increase in confidence.
4.4.4 Updated Return
The mean and variance of the expected return given the views of the investor could be
calculated by:
1 1 1 1 1( ) [( ) ' ] [( ) ' ]BLE r P P P Q 
    
      
1 1 1( ) [( ) ' ]BlVar r P P
  
   
Where
( )BLE r is the new (posterior) Combined Return Vector (N x 1 column vector)
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τ is the shrinkage factor for the covariance matrix;
Σ is the covariance matrix of excess returns (N x N matrix);
P is a matrix that identifies the assets involved in the views (K x N matrix );
Ω is a diagonal covariance matrix of error terms from the expressed views
representing the uncertainty in each view (K x K matrix);
Π is the equilibrium implied return vector (N x 1 column vector); and,
Q is the view that includes the relative performance figures (K x 1 column vector).
The mean-variance optimization process is then performed using the revised expected
returns as inputs to the model in order to calculate the optimal weights of the
portfolio:
1max ' ( ) '2BLw w E r w w  subject to ' 1w l 
where l is an (n×1) matrix of ones
Based on consensus analyst recommendations, the optimization procedure is
re-performed to generate a new portfolio using the Black-Litterman model. Therefore
the weightings of stocks under analyst coverage are adjusted depending on their level
of consensus recommendation. The consensus recommendation is recalculated every
time an outstanding recommendation is revised and when coverage of a stock is
initiated or terminated. As the consensus recommendation of a covered stock changes,
it is over or underweight by the Black-Litterman model. The portfolios are rebalanced
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on a daily basis at the close. The difference between the optimal portfolio one day and
the previous day will determine the trades that need to take place the rebalance the
portfolio. Trade lists are generated and the investment performance of the portfolio is
tracked in calendar time.
4.4.5 Covariance Shrinkage
In this study, the covariance matrix is multiplied by a shrinkage factor of 0.05 to
reduce the model’s sensitivity and improve its stability. Benninga (2008) suggest the
shrinkage method to produce more reliable estimates of the covariance matrix, while
pointing out that there is little theory about choosing the proper shrinkage factor.
Ledoit & Wolf (2003) and most prior literature suggest against using the sample
covariance matrix for the purpose of portfolio optimization as it contains “estimation
error of the kind most likely to perturb a mean-variance optimizer”. They strongly
recommend using the matrix obtained from the sample covariance matrix through
shrinkage. Black & Litterman (1992) posit that the covariance matrix of expected
returns is proportional to the historical one, rescaled by a shrinkage factor. Since
uncertainty of the mean is lower than the uncertainty of the returns themselves, the
value of τ should be close to zero. Blamont and Firoozye (2003) interpret τ as the
standard error of estimate of the equilibrium implied return vector ( ); thus, the
scalar τ should be approximately 1 divided by the number of observations. Wai Lee,
who has considerable experience working with variants of the Black-Litterman model,
61
recommends the value of τ to be between 0.01 and 0.05 (Idzorek 2004).
In our study, the Black-Litterman model has been performed using tau values other
than 0.05. A higher τ value (0.1) causes increase in abnormal return, risk and turnover,
whereas a lower τ (0.01) value causes a reduction in abnormal return, risk and
turnover. The shrinkage factor of 0.05 produced the higher Sortino ratios out of the
three, indicating a higher rate of return for every unit of downside risk.
Table 4: Inputs to the Black-Litterman Asset Allocation Model
Parameter Name Effect:
 Risk Aversion Increasing  means that the investor is
more risk averse and is more willing to
sacrifice return to reduce risk.
 Weight on Views Increasing τ increases the uncertainty of
equilibrium implied returns and places
more emphasis on the investor views.
 View Variance Increasing  increases the uncertainty
in the views, which means that the
investor has less confidence in them
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5. Results
Tables 5.1 to 5.5 show the main results of this study, which provides support to the
hypothesis that analyst recommendations have investment value, and that a trading
strategy based on overweighting (underweighting) stocks with favourable
(unfavourable) recommendations through a Black-Litterman Model is profitable
before transaction cost. We will first present the performances of consensus
recommendation portfolios and the Black-Litterman Portfolio. This is followed by an
examination of the effects of infrequent portfolio rebalancing, filtering of dated
recommendations and variations on the inputs to the view matrix. Investment
performances are then looked at separately in bull markets and bear markets, and for
different trade execution assumptions.
5.1 Consensus Recommendation Portfolios’ Performance from 30 June 1997 to
31 October 2002
For the estimation period from 30 June 1997 to 31 October 2002, the most favourably
recommended Portfolio 1 earns an annualized geometric mean gross return of 10.89%,
whereas holding the least favourably recommended Portfolio 3 generates an
annualized geometric mean return of -6.89% (Figure 2). Portfolio 2 which contains
stocks with a consensus recommendation between “buy” and “hold” earns 10.41%p.a.,
roughly the same level of gross return as Portfolio 1. Both favourably recommended
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Figure 2: 30/6/97-31/10/02
Annualized Geometric Mean Gross Return
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Annualized geometric mean gross return earned by portfolios formed based on the consensus of all analyst recommendations, in the period
from 30/6/97 to 31/10/02. Daily rebalancing is assumed to happen at the close of each day, and trades executed at the close price.
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portfolios outperform the unfavourably recommended portfolio by more than 15% p.a.
During this time the annualized geometric mean return for the S&P/ASX 50
Accumulation Index is 7.87%. Figure 6 graphs the cumulative market adjusted return
consensus recommendation portfolios from 30/6/1997 to 31/10/2002. It shows that
despite performance fluctuations, Portfolio 1 and 2 outperform the market while
Portfolio 3 significantly underperforms the market.
Table 5.1 shows the monthly performance of consensus group portfolios for the
estimation period 30 June 1997 to 31 October 2002. Consensus Portfolio 1 earns an
average monthly raw return of 1.02%, outperforming the market by 0.30%. Portfolio
2 earns an average monthly raw return of 0.92%, and a market adjusted abnormal
return of 0.19%. The least favourably recommended Portfolio 3 falls by an average of
0.37% per month, and has an abnormal return of –1.09% against the market. The
abnormal returns reported are not significant at the 10% level of significance. This is
mainly due to the high levels of volatility in the consensus portfolio returns.
To evaluate the risk adjusted performance of each portfolio, we calculate the Sharpe
and Sortino ratios to measure the portfolios’ return for every unit of volatility and
downside risk. The risk adjusted measures show that consensus portfolios formed on
the basis of favourable (unfavourable) analyst recommendations outperform
(underperform) the market. During the period, Portfolio 1 has a Sharpe Ratio of 0.94
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Table 5.1: Performances of the Black-Litterman Portfolio and Consensus Recommendation Portfolios (assuming daily rebalancing)
30 Jun e 1 997 to 31 Oct obe r 2 007
Po rtf oli o
Mo nth ly
M ean Ra w
Ret urn
Mo nth ly Mea n
Ma rke t
Adj ust ed
Re tur n
Sh arp e
Rat io
So rti no
R ati o
M onth ly
Turn ove r
M ont hly Re turn
Net of
T ran sac tion
Co st
Mont hly Ma rke t
Ad just ed Ret urn
Ne t of Tr ans act ion
Co st
P1 1.02% 0.30% 0.94 1.18 77% 0.66% -0.06%
0.802 -0.169
P2 0.92% 0.19% 1.03 1.43 37% 0.74% 0.02%
1.380 0.140
P3 -0.37% -1.09% -0.92 -1.50 78% -0.73% -1.42%
-1.438 -1. 960
Market 0.72% 0.62 0.84 0.72%
31 Oct obe r 2 002 to 30 Oct obe r 2 007
Po rtf oli o
Mo nth ly
M ean Ra w
Ret urn
Mo nth ly Mea n
Ma rke t
Adj ust ed
Re tur n
Sh arp e
Rat io
So rti no
R ati o
M onth ly
Turn ove r
M ont hly Re turn
Net of
T ran sac tion
Co st
Mont hly Ma rke t
Ad just ed Ret urn
Ne t of Tr ans act ion
Co st
BL 1.86% 0.35% 4.03 5.86 79% 1.49% -0.02%
2. 824 -0.188
P1 1.61% 0.10% 2.03 3.62 76% 1.25% -0.26%
0.228 -0.613
P2 1.61% 0.10% 3.64 5.75 30% 1.47% -0.05%
1.020 -0.510
P3 0.53% -0.98% 0.14 0.18 86% 0.13% -1.38%
- 2.9 54 -4. 168
Market 1.51% 3.27 5.22 1.51%
This table presents the mean monthly returns Sharpe and Sortino Ratios of consensus portfolios formed on the basis of analyst
recommendations and the Black-Litterman Portfolio formed on the basis of relative performance between consensus recommendation groups.
The number below the return figures are t-statistics pertaining to the null hypothesis that the associated return is zero. Abnormal returns that are
significant at the 10% level have their t-statistics shown in bold. Net performances are calculated assuming a roundtrip transaction cost of
0.47%. The returns are achieved by daily rebalancing of the portfolios. The consensus recommendations are calculated using all outstanding
recommendations. The Black-Litterman Portfolio uses tau = 0.05.
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and a Sortino Ratio of 1.18 outperforming the market’s 0.62 and 0.84. Despite earning
a smaller raw return, Portfolio 2 performs better after adjusting for risk, posting a
higher Sharpe Ratio of 1.03 and Sortino Ratio of 1.43. A possible explanation could
be that Portfolio 2 contains the majority of covered stocks in the index and hence is
better diversified. Portfolio 3 underperforms the market after adjusting for risk.
The reported returns thus far are gross of transaction costs associated with the high
levels of trading involved in our investment strategies. As shown in Table 5.1, the
implementation of our daily rebalancing strategies generates significant turnover. To
take into account transaction cost, we multiply each portfolio’s monthly turnover by
the assumed transaction cost of 0.47%. Interestingly, the monthly turnover of
Portfolio 2 is 37%, much lower than that of Portfolio 1 and 3, which had an average
monthly turnover of 77% and 78% respectively. This is likely a result of the fact that
more stocks fall into Portfolio 2 during the sample period, and hence each stock
represents a lower proportion of the total portfolio value. According to the summary
statistics in Table 1, 71% of stocks on average receive a consensus rating between a
“buy” and a “hold” hence falling into Portfolio 2, while Portfolio 1 and 3 only
contains 17.5% and 11.5% of stocks respectively. As stocks move from one consensus
group to another, Portfolio 1 & 3 will be required to turnover a higher proportion of
their total holdings to rebalance. After account for transaction cost, the net abnormal
returns for the two favourably recommended portfolios are close to zero, whereas
hold Portfolio 3 would cause a significant loss of 1.42% per month.
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5.2 Black-Litterman and Consensus Recommendation Portfolios’ Performance
from 31 October 2002 to 30 October 2007
The directions of market adjusted abnormal performances of consensus portfolios are
robust for the two sample period partitions. For the periods from 30 June 1997 to 31
October 2002 and from 31 October 2002 to 30 October 2007, portfolios of stocks with
favourable recommendations outperform the market, and stocks with unfavourable
recommendation underperform the market. An optimized portfolio of index
constituents using the Black-Litterman asset allocation model to incorporate expected
relative performance of stocks with different consensus recommendations consistently
outperforms individual consensus group portfolios and the market.
For the period from 31 October 2002 to October 30 2007, holding the most
favourably recommended Portfolio 1 generates an annualized geometric mean gross
return of 20.72%, whereas holding the least favourably recommended Portfolio 3
would generate an annualized geometric mean return of 6.22% (Figure 3). Portfolio 2
which contains stocks with a consensus recommendation between “buy” and “hold”
earns 21.09% p.a., slightly outperforming Portfolio 1. Figure 7 graphs the cumulative
market adjusted return consensus recommendation portfolios from 31 October 2002 to
30 October 2007. Although Portfolio 1 achieves a higher cumulative abnormal return
at the end of the period, its performance during the period is very unstable.
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Figure 3: 31/10/02-30/10/07
Annualized Geometric Mean Gross Return
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Annualized geometric mean gross return earned by portfolios formed based on the consensus of all analyst recommendations, in the period
from 31/10/02 to 30/10/07. Daily rebalancing is assumed to happen at the close of each day, and trades executed at the close price.
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Figure 4: Black-Litterman Portfolio Formed on the basis of
Relative Consensus Recommendation Portfolio Performances in the Estimation Period
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These performances are based on daily rebalancing at the close, with all recommendations included in the consensus calculation. The
Black-Litterman model uses constant relative performance views, updated confidence levels and tau = 0.05
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There are points in time where it underperforms the market, indicating the relative
performance may not be consistent in the short term. This suggests that over the
longer term, following analysts may pay off but it is highly path dependent and may
not necessarily pay off in shorter time frames. Similar to in the estimation period, the
favourably recommended Portfolios 1 & 2 outperform the unfavourably
recommended Portfolio 3 by around 14.5%p.a. The Black-Littman Portfolio
constructed on the basis of the consensus groups’ relative performance in the
estimation period performs very well. It earns an annualized geometric mean gross
return of 23.91%. During this time the annualized geometric mean return for the
S&P/ASX 50 Accumulation Index is 19.84%.
Table 5.1 shows the monthly performance of consensus recommendation portfolios
for the period from 31 October 2002 to October 30 2007. Consensus
Recommendation Portfolios 1 & 2 earn an average monthly raw return of 1.61% each,
outperforming the market by an insignificant 0.10% per month. The least favourably
recommended Portfolio 3 earns an average of 0.53% per month, and has an abnormal
return of –0.98% against the market, significant at the 1% level. The Black-Litterman
Portfolio earns an average monthly return of 1.86%, which is 0.35% above the
market’s monthly mean return. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level.
This result suggest that, not only does the Black-Litterman Portfolio earn a higher
market adjusted abnormal return, that outperformance is also more consistent and less
volatile.
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We calculate the Sharpe and Sortino ratios to measure the portfolios’ return for every
unit of volatility and downside risk. Once again, similar to in the estimation period,
Portfolio 2 performs best among the consensus groups after adjusting for risk, posting
a Sharpe Ratio of 3.64 and a Sortino Ratio of 5.75 compared to Portfolio 1’s 2.03 and
3.62. During this period, both Portfolio 1 and 3 underperform the market, after
adjusting for volatility and downside risk. Black-Litterman Portfolio outperforms the
market as well as all individual consensus groups after adjusting for risk, achieving a
Sharpe Ratio of 4.03 and a Sortino Ratio of 5.86.
From the above we can see that the Black-Litterman Portfolio exhibits higher return,
and lower volatility and downside risk. This is a result of overweighting
(underweighting) stocks with favourable (unfavourable) analyst recommendations by
incorporating their relative performance into a mean-variance optimization context.
This consistency in the performance of the Black-Litterman Portfolio is evident in
Figure 7, which shows the cumulative percentage market adjusted returns of
portfolios from 31 October 2002 to October 30 2007. The steady divergence of the
Black-Litterman Portfolio’s cumulative abnormal return contrasts with the unstable
performances of consensus Portfolio 1. Over the 5 year period, the Black-Litterman
Portfolio constructed on the basis of relative performance of consensus
recommendation groups outperforms the market by over 20% with little downside
risk.
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Figure 5: Performance of the Black-Litterman Portfolio, Consensus Portfolios and the S&P/ASX 50 Index
from 31/10/02 to 30/10/07
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These performances are based on daily rebalancing, at the close with all recommendations included in the consensus calculation. The
Black-Litterman model uses constant relative performance views, updated confidence levels and tau = 0.05
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Figure 6: Cumulative Percentage Market Adjusted Return Earned by Portfolios
Formed on the Basis of Consensus Analyst Recommendations from 30/6/1997 to 31/10/2002
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These performances are based on daily rebalancing at the close, with all recommendations included in the consensus calculation. The
Black-Litterman model uses constant relative performance views, updated confidence levels and tau = 0.05
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Figure 7: Cumulative Percentage Market Adjusted Return Earned by
the Black-Litterman Portfolio and Consensus Group Portfolios from 31/10/2002 to 30/10/2003
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These performances are based on daily rebalancing at the close, with all recommendations included in the consensus calculation. The
Black-Litterman model uses constant relative performance views, updated confidence levels and tau = 0.05
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The reported performance measures above are gross of transaction costs. As have
been shown, the implementation of our daily rebalancing strategies generates
significant turnover. The Black-Litterman Portfolio turns over 79% of its value every
month. The monthly turnover of Portfolio 2 is 30%, again much lower than that of
Portfolio 1 and 3, which have an average monthly turnover of 76% and 86%
respectively. After accounting for transaction cost, the net abnormal returns for the
Black-Litterman Portfolio and the two favourably recommended portfolios are
negative but statistically insignificant, whereas hold Portfolio 3 would cause a
statistically significant loss of 1.38% per month.
We also test the performance of the Black-Litterman Portfolio using different
covariance shrinkage factors – the results shown in Table 5.5 and Figure 8. Increasing
(decreasing) the covariance shrinkage factor τ increases (decreases) the uncertainty of
equilibrium implied returns and places more (less) emphasis on the investor views.
Consequently the asset allocations are tilted more (less) aggressively. Thus a larger
(smaller) τ is likely to cause increases in return, risk and turnover. Consistent with
expectations, we find that a higher τ (0.1) causes increase in monthly abnormal return
to 0.65%, while a lower τ (0.01) value causes a reduction in monthly abnormal return
to 0.09%. Risk and turnover also increase (decrease) with the increase (decrease) in τ.
The Black-Litterman Portfolio consistently outperforms the market given different
shrinkage factors (see Figure 8). The gross abnormal returns with different covariance
shrinkage factors remain statistically significant, whereas all net abnormal returns are
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Figure 8: The Performance of Black-Litterman Portfolios with Different Levels of Covariance Shrinkage
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These performances are based on daily rebalancing at the close, with all recommendations included in the consensus calculation. The
Black-Litterman model uses constant relative performance views, updated confidence levels
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at an insignificant –0.02% per month. The shrinkage factor of 0.05 produces the
higher Sortino ratios out of the three, suggesting that every unit of downside risk is
compensated by a higher rate of return. The results indicate that a decrease in τ causes
a reduction performance as well as portfolio variance, and hence the gross abnormal
return remain significant for τ = 0.01. An increase in τ to 0.1 causes an increase in raw
returns, but that is balanced out by the additional transaction cost generated from
higher turnover.
5.3 The Effect of Infrequent Rebalancing
The investment performance figures reported in this study are achieved assuming that
investors have access to analyst recommendations on the day of their release and
rebalance their portfolios daily to reflect revisions in analyst recommendations. In
reality this investment strategy generates excessive amounts of trading and transaction
costs for the investor. This section examines whether frequent rebalancing is essential
in order to capture the abnormal returns associated with analyst recommendations.
According to Barber et al (2001), less frequent rebalancing should cause abnormal
returns to diminish, because investors will be less likely to capture the price drift
occurring in the early days after a stock enters a particular portfolio, and they will
continue to hold a stock after it moves from the portfolio. In this section, we track the
performance of the consensus recommendation portfolios as well as the
Black-Litterman Portfolio achieved through rebalancing at the end of every month.
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The consensus recommendation of each covered stock is calculated as of the close the
last trading day of every month. The stocks are not traded again until the end of the
next month when the consensus recommendations are recalculated and portfolios are
rebalanced. Portfolio return and turnover are calculated again (as described in the
Research Design Section).
Table 5.2 shows the monthly performance results of consensus group portfolios for
the estimation period from 30 June 1997 to 31 October 2002, achieved though
monthly rebalancing. Consensus Recommendation Portfolio 1 earns an average
monthly raw return of 1.15%, outperforming the market by 0.43%. Contrary to our
hypothesis, this result is slightly better than the return achieved through daily
rebalancing. All other portfolios’ performances are as expected, where returns of
favourably (unfavourably) recommended portfolios achieved through monthly
rebalancing is lower (higher) than returns achieved through daily rebalancing. This is
because the delay in reaction will decrease the impact of both favourable and
unfavourable recommendations on stock prices. Also as expected, turnover decreases
significantly as a result of infrequent rebalancing. Portfolio 2 earns an average
monthly raw return of 0.81%, and a market adjusted abnormal return of 0.09%, which
is lower than the returns from daily rebalancing. The least favourably recommended
Portfolio 3 falls by an average of 0.30% per month, and has an abnormal return of
–1.03% against the market (slightly higher than the –1.09% through daily
rebalancing). The abnormal returns reported are not significant at the 10% level of
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Table 5.2: Performances of the Black-Litterman Portfolio and Consensus Recommendation Portfolios (assuming monthly rebalancing)
30 Jun e 1 997 to 31 Oct obe r 2 007
Po rtf oli o
Mo nth ly
M ean Ra w
Ret urn
Mo nth ly Mea n
Ma rke t
Adj ust ed
Re tur n
Sh arp e
Rat io
So rti no
R ati o
M onth ly
Turn ove r
M ont hly Re turn
Net of
T ran sac tion
Co st
Mont hly Ma rke t
Ad just ed Ret urn
Ne t of Tr ans act ion
Co st
P1 1.15% 0.43% 1.08 1.38 30% 1.01% 0.29%
1.086 0.728
P2 0.81% 0.09% 0.81 1.06 15% 0.74% 0.02%
1.380 0.152
P3 -0.30% -1.03% -0.88 -1.36 37% -0.48% -1.20%
-1.366 -1.596
Market 0.72% 0.62 0.84 0.72%
31 Oct obe r 2 002 to 30 Oct obe r 2 007
Po rtf oli o
Mo nth ly
M ean Ra w
Ret urn
Mo nth ly Mea n
Ma rke t
Adj ust ed
Re tur n
Sh arp e
Rat io
So rti no
R ati o
M onth ly
Turn ove r
M ont hly Re turn
Net of
T ran sac tion
Co st
Mont hly Ma rke t
Ad just ed Ret urn
Ne t of Tr ans act ion
Co st
BL 1.71% 0.19% 3.50 5.04 22% 1.61% 0.09%
1.371 0.648
P1 1.57% 0.05% 2.18 3.50 32% 1.42% -0.10%
0.138 -0.254
P2 1.57% 0.06% 3.41 5.45 10% 1.53% 0.01%
0.628 0.139
P3 0.76% -0.76% 0.50 0.63 34% 0.60% -0.91%
- 1.6 69 -2. 017
Market 1.51% 3.27 5.22 1.51%
This table presents the mean monthly returns Sharpe and Sortino Ratios of consensus portfolios formed on the basis of analyst
recommendations and the Black-Litterman Portfolio formed on the basis of relative performance between consensus recommendation groups.
The number below the return figures are t-statistics pertaining to the null hypothesis that the associated return is zero. Abnormal returns that are
significant at the 10% level have their t-statistics shown in bold. Net performances are calculated assuming a roundtrip transaction cost of
0.47%. The returns are achieved by monthly rebalancing of the portfolios. The consensus recommendations are calculated using all outstanding
recommendations. The Black-Litterman Portfolio uses tau = 0.05.
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significance. The turnovers of all three consensus portfolios roughly halves as a result
of less frequent rebalancing. This causes a substantial reduction in transaction cost.
The net market adjusted abnormal returns remain insignificantly different from zero.
Table 5.2 also shows the monthly performance results of consensus portfolios for the
period from 31 October 2002 to October 30 2007 achieved through monthly
rebalancing. Consensus Recommendation Portfolio 1 & 2 earns average monthly raw
returns of 1.57% each, insignificantly outperforming the market by 0.05%. The least
favourably recommended Portfolio 3 earns an average of 0.76% per month, and has
an abnormal return of –0.76% against the market, significant at the 10% level. For the
purpose of comparability, both Black-Litterman Portfolios with daily and monthly
rebalancing share the same view matrix estimated by the abnormal returns from
Consensus Portfolios using daily rebalancing in the estimation period. The
Black-Litterman Portfolio earns an average monthly return of 1.71%. The market
adjusted abnormal return for the Black-Litterman Portfolio using monthly rebalancing
decreases from a significant 0.35% using daily rebalancing to an insignificant 0.19%
under monthly rebalancing. This is accompanied by an increase in net returns after
transaction costs due to the substantial reduction in transaction costs as monthly
turnover drops from 79% to 22%. The resulting net abnormal return is positive but
insignificantly different from zero. In contrast to the loss of significance of the
Black-Litterman Portfolio’s abnormal return, the market adjusted return for
Consensus Portfolio 3 remains significant. Again, monthly turnover declines
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substantially, from 86% with daily rebalancing to 34% under monthly rebalancing.
The above results seem to be consistent with the notion that infrequent rebalancing
reduces the abnormal performances captured by our investment strategies. In general,
there is a decrease in return and turnover. The abnormal returns net of transaction cost
remains statistically insignificant.
We calculate the Sharpe and Sortino ratios to measure the portfolios’ return for every
unit of volatility and downside risk. The Black-Litterman Portfolio outperforms the
market and all individual consensus groups after adjusting for risk, achieving a Sharpe
Ratio of 3.50 and a Sortino Ratio of 5.04. This is worse than under daily rebalancing.
Portfolio 2 performs best among the consensus groups after adjusting for risk, posting
a Sharpe Ratio of 3.41 and a Sortino Ratio of 5.45; this compares to Portfolio 1’s 2.18
and 3.50. Both Portfolio 1 and 3 underperforms the market after adjusting for
volatility and downside risk. These results also support the hypothesis that infrequent
rebalancing reduces the performance of our investment strategy.
5.4 Filtering of Dated Recommendations
In this section, we investigate the effects of using only recently issued
recommendations in our consensus calculations on the investment performances. This
is done to test whether the performances of trading strategies based on analyst
recommendations can be improved by filtering dated recommendations. As Green
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(2003) suggests, one of the possible reasons that consensus recommendations perform
poorly in some prior studies is because some of the recommendations that enter into
the consensus can be fairly stale. If analysts leave their recommendations on stock
outstanding for extended periods of time, they may become obsolete. When dated
recommendations enter the calculation along with recently issued recommendations
they may distort the investment value of the consensus recommendation. Therefore
filtering stale recommendations may generate better consensus portfolio performance.
On the other hand, a recommendation is not like an earnings forecast, which will
change more frequently and suffer from staleness to a larger degree. There could be
long standing recommendations that reflect the analyst’s view incorporating up to date
information. In this case the analyst may not need to update their recommendation and
its issuance date could be from many months prior. Furthermore, some researches
suggest that not including all recommendations as part of the consensus may make it
less informative. Elton et al. (1986) finds consensus analyst recommendations
outperform individual analyst recommendations in their predictive ability. Clemen
(1989) finds through the review of literature on forecasting that predictive accuracy of
forecasts can be substantially improved through the combination of multiple
individual forecasts. He also suggests that simple combination methods (like simple
averaging) often perform better than more complex combinations.
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Table 5.3: Performances of the Black-Litterman Portfolio and Consensus Recommendation Portfolios (using outstanding
recommendations within 45 days of issuance)
30 June 1 997 to 31 Oct obe r 2007
Portfolio
Monthly
Mean Raw
Return
Mo nth ly Mea n
Ma rke t
Adj ust ed
Re tur n
Sh arp e
Rat io
So rti no
R ati o
M onth ly
Turn ove r
Monthly Re turn
Net of
Transaction
Cost
Monthly Ma rke t
Adjusted Ret urn
Net of Trans act ion
Cost
P1 1.14% 0.41% 1.08 1.56 205% 0.18% -0.55%
0.928 -1.225
P2 0.46% -0.27% 0.05 0.08 162% -0.31% -1.03%
-1.076 -4.134
P3 0.25% -0.47% -0.28 -0.36 170% -0.55% -1.27%
-1.202 -3.228
Market 0.72% 0.62 0.84 0.72%
31 Octobe r 2 002 to 30 Oct ober 2007
Portfolio
Monthly
Mean Raw
Return
Mo nth ly Mea n
Ma rke t
Adj ust ed
Re tur n
Sh arp e
Rat io
So rti no
R ati o
M onth ly
Turn ove r
Monthly Re turn
Net of
Transaction
Cost
Monthly Ma rke t
Adjusted Ret urn
Net of Trans act ion
Cost
BL 1.70% 0.19% 3.59 4.95 127% 1.10% -0.41%
2. 168 -4.796
P1 1.57% 0.05% 2.14 3.55 221% 0.53% -0.99%
0.130 -2.497
P2 1.75% 0.23% 3.24 4.62 159% 1.00% -0.52%
1.398 -3.116
P3 1.12% -0.39% 2.02 3.65 156% 0.39% -1.12%
- 2.0 00 -5.736
Market 1.51% 3.27 5.22 1.51%
This table presents the mean monthly returns Sharpe and Sortino Ratios of consensus portfolios formed on the basis of analyst recommendations
and the Black-Litterman Portfolio formed on the basis of relative performance between consensus recommendation groups. The number below
the return figures are t-statistics pertaining to the null hypothesis that the associated return is zero. Abnormal returns that are significant at the
10% level have their t-statistics shown in bold. Net performances are calculated assuming a roundtrip transaction cost of 0.47%. The returns are
achieved by daily rebalancing of the portfolios. The consensus recommendations are calculated using outstanding recommendations within 45
days of issuance. The Black-Litterman Portfolio uses tau = 0.05.
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To examine these hypotheses associated with trading strategies based on consensus
recommendations, we look at the performance of trading strategies based on recent
recommendations. The analyst-by-analyst recommendations for all individual updates
and revisions are extracted and programmed to form our customized consensus
recommendations. This is done by averaging the stock recommendations that has been
outstanding for only a certain number of days. We apply two arbitrary cut-off’s on
outstanding recommendations: 103 days (the median interval between analyst
recommendation updates) and a shorter time frame of 45 days. The percentage
monthly results earned by these two simulations are presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.
The Black-Litterman Portfolios’ view vectors use relative performances of consensus
portfolios with the respective calendar day cut-offs of dated recommendations.
The results seem to send a mix signal as to whether using only recently issued
recommendations convey benefits. Table 5.3 shows the monthly performance of
consensus group portfolios for the estimation period from 30 June 1997 to 31
October 2002, achieved by using recommendations issued in the recent 45 days.
Consensus Recommendation Portfolio 1 earns an average monthly raw return of
1.14%, outperforming the market by 0.41%. This is slightly better than the 1.02%
earned by consensus recommendations calculated without filtering of dated
recommendations. On the other hand, Portfolio 2 earns an average monthly raw return
of 0.46%, and a market adjusted abnormal return of -0.27%, which is worse than the
0.92% earned using consensus recommendations incorporating all outstanding
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recommendations. The least favourably recommended Portfolio 3 falls by an average
of 0.25% per month, and has an abnormal return of –0.47% against the market, which
is better than the –0.37% earned using consensus recommendations incorporating all
outstanding recommendations. The reported returns thus far are gross of transaction
costs. As shown in Table 5.3, the implementation of our filtering of dated
recommendations generates significant increases in turnovers. The turnovers of
consensus Portfolios 1, 2 & 3 jump from the previous 77%, 37% and 78% to 205%,
162% and 170% respectively. This results in significant increases in transaction cost.
The net abnormal returns of both Portfolios 2 & 3 are significantly negative. This is
expected, since the calculation of the consensus recommendation involves only the
most recent individual recommendations it is likely to change more drastically as new
recommendations are issued. This would, in turn, cause stocks to move between
consensus groups more frequently.
For the period 31 October 2002 to October 30 2007, Consensus Portfolio 1, with a 45
days recommendation cut-off, earns an average monthly raw return of 1.57%, whereas
Portfolio 2 earns an average monthly raw return of 1.75%. The least favourably
recommended Portfolio 3 earns an average of 1.12% per month. The Black-Litterman
Portfolio earns an average monthly return of 1.70%, which is 0.19% above the
market’s monthly mean return. It is lower than the result achieved by incorporating all
outstanding recommendations, but remains statistically significant. The lower
performance could be attributed to the difference in relative performance of consensus
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portfolios from 30 June 1997 to 31 October 2002 (which makes the view matrix for
the period from 31 October 2002 to October 30 2007) and the realized performance in
the later period. During the period from 30 June 1997 to 31 October 2002 Portfolio 1
performs very well, whereas Portfolio 2 performs relatively poorly. The reverse was
true from 31 October 2002 to October 30 2007. Turnover during this period also
increases dramatically. The Black-Litterman Portfolio’s monthly turnover increases
from 79% without filtering of dated recommendations to 127% with a 45 days cut-off.
This causes it to incur a statistically significant negative abnormal return net of
transaction cost. The consensus portfolios also experienced substantial increases in
turnover and transaction cost, which causes all of them to incur a statistically
significant negative net abnormal return.
Table 5.4 shows the monthly performance of consensus group portfolios for the
estimation period from 30 June 1997 to 31 October 2002, achieved though using
recommendations issued in the recent 103 days. The results are also mixed in their
support for both hypotheses. Consensus Recommendation Portfolio 1 earns an
average monthly raw return of only 0.64%, underperforming the market by 0.08%.
This is worse than the 1.02% earned by consensus recommendations incorporating all
outstanding recommendations. On the other hand, Portfolio 2 earns an average
monthly raw return of 1.19%, and a market adjusted abnormal return of 0.46%, which
is better than the 0.92% earned without he filtering of dated recommendations. The
least favourably recommended Portfolio 3 falls by an average of 0.48% per month,
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Table 5.4: Performances of the Black-Litterman Portfolio and Consensus Recommendation Portfolios (using outstanding
recommendations within 103 days of issuance)
30 June 1997 to 31 October 2007
Portfolio
Monthly
Mean Raw
Return
Monthly Mean
Market
Adjusted
Return
Sharpe
Ratio
Sortino
Ratio
Monthly
Turnover
Monthly Return
Net of
Transaction
Cost
Monthly Market
Adjusted Return
Net of Transaction
Cost
P1 0.64% -0.08% 0.33 0.46 145% -0.04% -0.76%
-0.178 -1.657
P2 1.19% 0.46% 1.43 2.16 82% 0.80% 0.08%
2.373 0.392
P3 -0.48% -1.20% -1.52 -2.07 136% -1.12% -1.84%
-2.907 -4.459
Market 0.72% 0.62 0.84 0.72%
31 October 2002 to 30 October 2007
Portfolio
Monthly
Mean Raw
Return
Monthly Mean
Market
Adjusted
Return
Sharpe
Ratio
Sortino
Ratio
Monthly
Turnover
Monthly Return
Net of
Transaction
Cost
Monthly Market
Adjusted Return
Net of Transaction
Cost
BL 1.88% 0.36% 3.18 6.69 221% 0.84% -0.68%
1.400 -2.627
P1 2.41% 0.90% 3.37 3.46 138% 1.76% 0.25%
1.939 0.538
P2 1.61% 0.10% 3.30 5.62 144% 0.94% -0.58%
0.896 -5.243
P3 1.09% -0.42% 1.64 2.70 106% 0.59% -0.92%
-1.862 -4.043
Market 1.51% 3.27 5.22 1.51%
This table presents the mean monthly returns Sharpe and Sortino Ratios of consensus portfolios formed on the basis of analyst
recommendations and the Black-Litterman Portfolio formed on the basis of relative performance between consensus recommendation groups.
The number below the return figures are t-statistics pertaining to the null hypothesis that the associated return is zero. Abnormal returns that are
significant at the 10% level have their t-statistics shown in bold. Net performances are calculated assuming a roundtrip transaction cost of
0.47%. The returns are achieved by daily rebalancing of the portfolios. The consensus recommendations are calculated using outstanding
recommendations within 103 days of issuance. The Black-Litterman Portfolio uses tau = 0.05.
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more than the 0.37% monthly drop without filtering dated recommendations. The
turnovers of consensus Portfolios 1, 2 & 3 roughly doubled from the previous 77%,
37% and 78% to 145%, 82%, and 136% respectively, but were lower than that of the
simulation with a 45 days cut-off of recommendations. This is expected, since
relaxing the filtering criterion of outstanding recommendations to a longer interval
would incorporate a larger number of outstanding recommendations, which would
reduce the variance of the consensus and in turn cause stocks to move between
consensus groups less frequently. This will likely generate more stable performance
and reduce transaction costs.
For the period from 31 October 2002 to October 30 2007, Consensus
Recommendation Portfolio 1 earns an average monthly raw return of 2.41%, whereas
Portfolio 2 earns an average monthly raw return of 1.61%, both outperforming the
market return of 1.51%. The least favourably recommended Portfolio 3 continues to
underperform the market, earning an average of 1.09% per month. The
Black-Litterman Portfolio earns an average monthly return of 1.88%, which is 0.36%
above the market’s monthly mean return. It is approximately the same as the result
achieved by incorporating all outstanding recommendations. However, it has become
statistically insignificant, which is due to an increase in portfolio variance. The
performance could be attributed to the consistency in Portfolio 2’s outperformance,
and the fact that it contains on average 70% of covered stocks. It is overweighted by
the Black-Litterman model and performs very well during the complete sample period.
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Turnover during this period also increases dramatically. The Black-Litterman
Portfolio’s monthly turnover increases from 79% without filtering of dated
recommendations to 221% with a 103 days cut-off. This causes it to incur a
significant negative abnormal return net of transaction costs. The consensus portfolios
also experienced similar increases in turnover and transaction costs, which cause
Portfolio 2 & 3 to incur a statistically significant negative net abnormal return.
From the results above we can see that the performance of the consensus groups and
the Black-Litterman Portfolio are sensitive to the filtering of dated recommendations.
Results are mixed as to whether using consensus recommendations formed with
recently issued recommendations convey benefits. Performance of consensus
portfolios becomes less consistent across time when dated outstanding
recommendations are excluded from calculations. Turnovers also increase
substantially. Calculation that takes into account all outstanding recommendations
tends to generate more consistent consensus portfolio performances, and lower
turnover. This is beneficial to the Black-Litterman strategy, since views are expressed
in terms of long term relative performance. Outperformance (underperformance) in
the estimation period translates to overweight (underweight) in the test period.
5.5 Changing Assumptions of the View Matrix
In the Black-Litterman simulation, the level of consensus portfolio performance
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relative to the market is assumed to be constant in the long run, while our confidence
in the views depends on the short-term volatility of the view portfolio. To see the
effect of continuous updating of the view portfolio along with confidence levels or
keeping both view and confidence fixed, we run two additional simulations. In the
first one, views are updated depending on the recent performances of the consensus
portfolios over the past 3 month (i.e. the Q vector of relative performance is
continuously updated), whereas in the second one confidence is kept constant (i.e. the
 matrix is fixed) as the variance of consensus portfolio during the estimation
period. Table 5.5 and Figure 9 show the performance of Black-Litterman Portfolios
with these different view parameters.
The Black-Litterman Portfolio with its view matrix updated on a daily basis of the
consensus portfolios’ past 3 month’s abnormal return as input performs poorly. It
generates a mean monthly return of 1.42%, underperforming the market by 0.10%
while generating an extremely high level of turnover of 270% per month. This is due
to the fact that the inputs to the Black-Litterman asset allocation model are
continuously changing, which generates large amounts of rebalancing trades. This
result is expected, since in the long term, consensus portfolios with favourable
recommendations would on average outperform the market and consensus portfolios
with unfavourable recommendations. The abnormal performance of consensus
portfolios may not be robust in the short term, hence updating the return vector of
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Figure 9: The Performance of Black-Litterman Portfolios with Different View Matrices and Confidence Assumptions
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These performances are based on daily rebalancing at the close, with all recommendations included in the consensus calculation. The
Black-Litterman model uses tau = 0.05
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Table 5.5: Performances of Variations of the Black-Litterman Portfolio
31 October 2002 to 30 October 2007
Portfolio
Monthly
Mean Raw
Return
Monthly Mean
Market
Adjusted
Return
Sharpe
Ratio
Sortino
Ratio
Monthly
Turnover
Monthly Return
Net of
Transaction
Cost
Monthly Market
Adjusted Return
Net of Transaction
Cost
BL Dynamic
View
1.42% -0.10% 2.51 3.54 270% 0.15% -1.37%
-0.516 -7.126
BL Static
Confidence
1.58% 0.07% 3.54 5.41 22% 1.48% -0.04%
1.915 -0.997
BL 0.1 tau 2.16% 0.65% 4.21 5.63 142% 1.49% -0.02%
2.760 -0.087
BL 0.05 tau 1.86% 0.35% 4.03 5.86 79% 1.49% -0.02%
2.824 -0.188
BL 0.01 tau 1.61% 0.09% 3.53 5.49 24% 1.49% -0.02%
2.652 -0.585
This table presents the mean monthly returns Sharpe and Sortino Ratios of Black-Litterman Portfolios formed on the basis of relative
performance between consensus recommendation groups. The number below the return figures are t-statistics pertaining to the null hypothesis
that the associated return is zero. Abnormal returns that are significant at the 10% level have their t-statistics shown in bold. Net performances
are calculated assuming a roundtrip transaction cost of 0.47%. The returns are achieved by daily rebalancing of the portfolios. The
Black-Litterman Portfolio with dynamic view updates both the relative performance between consensus recommendation groups and
confidence on the views based on their past three month’s performance, whereas both view and confidence stays constant for the
Black-Litterman Portfolio with static confidence. All other Black-Litterman Portfolio’s in this thesis assumes constant long-term relative
performance while updating confidence levels based on variance of their performance.
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the view matrix would cause inappropriate positions to be taken based on the short
term performance of a consensus group. This is consistent with Figure 9, which show
the Black-Litterman Portfolio with updating view vector underperforming the market.
We also run a Black-Litterman Portfolio with constant level of confidence in the
views. The variances of the views (instead of being the equal to 'k kP P ) are assumed
to be the historical variance of the consensus portfolio’s abnormal return over the
estimation period. It earns a lower rate of monthly return of 1.58% (beating the
market by 0.07%) while generating a much lower turnover of only 22% per month.
The lower turnover is caused by the static inputs to the Black-Litterman model, which
results in less rebalancing trades to occur. The lower return here compared to a
Black-Litterman Portfolio with updating confidence levels is due to the fact that the
neutral portfolio is tilted to the same extent throughout the sample period, which
doesn’t take into account changes in market volatility. Updating the confidence has
positive effect on the portfolios’ gross return, as the portfolios are tilted less
aggressively away from the market in uncertain periods of time, and more
aggressively towards the views expressed by analyst recommendations in more
certain periods of time.
5.6 Bull Market and Bear Market Robustness
Since bull markets predominated during our sample period from 1997 to 2007, doubt
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may rise as to whether the performance results of the consensus groups and the
Black-Litterman portfolio are driven by the upward moving market. That is analysts
may be more skilful at stock picking in the rising market, but not a falling market. A
robustness check is performed to address this problem, where the estimation and
testing periods are separated into bull and bear month. If during a particular month,
the market return represented by the S&P/ASX 50 Accumulation Index is positive
(negative), it is classified as a bull (bear) month. This is similar to the approach use in
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) who study the performance of glamour and
value stocks in bull and bear markets. For 1997 to 2002, 34% of the months are
classified as bear markets, while 66% are classified as bull markets. For 2002 to 2007,
23% of the months are classified as bear markets, while 77% are classified as bull
markets.
The average monthly raw return and market adjusted returns for bull and bear markets
are calculated and reported in Table 6.1. The signs of the market adjusted abnormal
returns are robust for daily rebalancing portfolios, but only a few of them are
significant. Portfolio 1 and 2, and the Black-Litterman continue to outperform the
market, whereas Portfolio 3 consistently underperforms the market. For the
simulations ran with monthly portfolio rebalancing, the results are robust for the
Black-Litterman Portfolio and Portfolio 3 across both bull markets and bear markets
as they continue to generate positive and negative market adjusted returns,
respectively. Although Portfolios 1 and 2 do not consistently beat the market in
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Table 6.1: Percentage Monthly Return Earned by the Black-Litterman Portfolio and Consensus Recommendation Portfolios for Bull
and Bear Market Months (Daily and Monthly Rebalancing)
97 -02 97- 02
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
P1 2.97% 0.10% -2.69% 0.68% P1 3.44% 0.57% -3.22% 0.16%
0.230 0.930 1.259 0.209
P2 3.00% 0.13% -3.05% 0.32% P2 2.83% -0.04% -3.04% 0.34%
0.676 1.593 -0.229 1.7 48
P3 1.60% -1.27% -4.05% -0.68% P3 1.49% -1.38% -3.73% -0.36%
-1.372 -0.582 -1.531 -0.261
02 -07 02- 07
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
P1 2.72% 0.07% -2.03% 0.20% P1 2.59% -0.07% -1.78% 0.44%
0.132 0.269 -0.144 0.649
P2 2.74% 0.09% -2.12% 0.10% P2 2.70% 0.05% -2.12% 0.11%
0.777 0.740 0.394 0.731
P3 1.83% -0.82% -3.72% -1.50% P3 2.09% -0.56% -3.62% -1.40%
-2 .66 2 -1.519 -1.188 -1.211
BL 3.07% 0.41% -2.09% 0.13% BL 2.91% 0.25% -2.23% -0.01%
2 .97 7 0.504 1.522 -0.025
M ont hly Re bal anci ngDai ly Reb ala nci ng
Bu ll Be arBull B ear
Bull B ear Bu ll Be ar
This table presents the mean monthly returns earned by consensus portfolios formed on the basis of analyst recommendations and the
Black-Litterman Portfolio formed on the basis of relative performance between consensus groups, for bull and bear market months. A bull (bear)
market month is defined as one where the return of the S&P/ASX 50 Accumulation Index is positive (negative). For the period from 30/6/1997
to 31/10/2002, 66% (34%) of the months are bull (bear) markets, whereas for the period from 31/10/2002 to 30/10/2007, 77% (23%) of the
months are bull (bear) markets. The number below the return figures are t-statistics pertaining to the null hypothesis that the associated return is
zero. Abnormal returns that are significant at the 10% level have their t-statistics shown in bold. The consensus recommendations are calculated
using all outstanding recommendations.
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Table 6.2: Percentage Monthly Return Earned by the Black-Litterman Portfolio and Consensus Recommendation Portfolios for Bull
and Bear Market Months (with 45 days and 103 days Cut-Off for Outstanding Recommendations)
97 -02 97- 02
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
P1 3.15% 0.28% -2.70% 0.68% P1 2.50% -0.37% -2.91% 0.46%
0.486 0.926 -0.613 0.654
P2 2.35% -0.52% -3.17% 0.21% P2 3.41% 0.54% -3.05% 0.32%
-1.465 0.824 1.9 4 1.50
P3 2.77% -0.10% -4.56% -1.18% P3 1.53% -1.34% -4.30% -0.93%
-0.208 -1 .813 - 2.6 9 -1.25
02 -07 02- 07
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
Raw
Mkt
Adjusted
P1 2.60% -0.05% -1.84% 0.38% P1 3.60% 0.95% -1.49% 0.73%
-0.102 0.551 1 .85 9 0.686
P2 2.99% 0.33% -2.32% -0.10% P2 2.76% 0.11% -2.15% 0.07%
1 .71 5 -0.338 0.817 0.366
P3 2.17% -0.49% -2.30% -0.08% P3 2.32% -0.34% -2.94% -0.71%
-1 .92 8 -0.330 -1.283 -1.572
BL 2.84% 0.18% -2.03% 0.19% BL 3.08% 0.43% -2.10% 0.12%
1 .85 9 1.156 1.404 0.285
Rec omm end ati ons wit h 4 5 D ays Cu t-Of f
Bull
Bull
B ear
B ear
R eco mme nda tio ns w ith 10 3 D ays Cut -Of f
Bu ll Be ar
Bu ll Be ar
This table presents the mean monthly returns earned by consensus portfolios formed on the basis of analyst recommendations and the
Black-Litterman Portfolio formed on the basis of relative performance between consensus groups, for bull and bear market months. A bull (bear)
market month is defined as one where the return of the S&P/ASX 50 Accumulation Index is positive (negative). For the period from 30/6/1997
to 31/10/2002, 66% (34%) of the months are bull (bear) markets, whereas for the period from 31/10/2002 to 30/10/2007, 77% (23%) of the
months are bull (bear) markets. The returns are achieved by daily rebalancing of the portfolios. The number below the return figures are
t-statistics pertaining to the null hypothesis that the associated return is zero. Abnormal returns that are significant at the 10% level have their
t-statistics shown in bold. The consensus recommendations are calculated using outstanding recommendations within 45 days (103 days) of
issuance.
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bull and bear months, they continue to outperform Portfolio 3.
We also look at the performance in bull / bear months of simulations using only
recently issued recommendations (see Table 6.2). After excluding recommendations
which have been outstanding for more than 45 days consensus Portfolios 1 & 2 do not
consistently beat the market in bull and bear months, while on average, they continue
to outperform Portfolio 3. The Black-Litterman Portfolio and Portfolio 3 continue to
generate positive and negative market adjusted abnormal returns respectively across
both bull markets and bear markets. After excluding recommendations which have
been outstanding for more than 103 days, , Portfolios 2 & 3 outperform and
underperform the index respectively in both bull and bear markets whereas Portfolio 1
outperforms the index in bear markets, but underperforms in bull markets, from 30
June 1997 to 31 October 2002. Portfolios 1 & 2, and the Black-Litterman Portfolio
continue to outperform both Portfolio 3 and the market in the period from 31 October
2002 to 30 October 2007.
5.7 Execution Robustness
The robustness of the results is further tests by assuming different execution prices
other than the close price. Trades are assumed to have executed at the trading day’s
VWAP or buyer-initiated and seller-initiated VWAP for buy and sell orders
respectively. The results achieved with different execution assumptions are fairly
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consistent to assuming rebalancing at the close price. Returns achieved by assuming
buyer-initiated and seller-initiated VWAP are lower in most cases than returns
achieved assuming close price or VWAP execution, because the buyer-initiated and
seller-initiated VWAP incorporates, to a certain extent, price impact cost and bid-ask
spreads. However, there are a large proportion of days where the buyer-initiated
VWAP was lower than the seller-initiated VWAP presumably because buyer-initiated
trades occurred at lower intraday prices. The results are reported in Appendix B.
6. Conclusion
Analysts carry out research on listed companies in an attempt to identify discrepancies
between the intrinsic value and market price of securities. Stock recommendations are
issued with the explicit purpose of improving investment performance by exploiting
perceived market mispricing. The purpose of this study is to examine the investment
value of analyst recommendations on the Australian equity market. We find that
stocks with favourable consensus recommendations (“strong buy” and “buy”) on
average earns a higher return than the market, whereas stocks with unfavourable
recommendations (“strong sell” and “sell”) earns a lower return. The relative
performances of portfolios constructed on the basis of consensus analyst
recommendations are somewhat path depended and unstable in the short term. An
investment strategy using the Black-Litterman asset allocation model that overweights
(underweights) stocks with favourable (unfavourable) consensus recommendations, in
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conjunction with daily rebalancing, produced more stable and statistically significant
abnormal performance. It outperforms the market in terms of return and risk adjusted
performance measures. Its performance is also consistent across bull markets and bear
markets and for different execution assumptions. The implementation of our daily
rebalancing strategies generates significant turnover and transaction cost. Less
frequent rebalancing, in most cases, causes a decrease in both performance and
turnover. Filtering of dated recommendations causes an increase in turnover, while
creating mixed effects on investment returns. After accounting for a reasonable
amount of transaction cost no significant abnormal profit opportunities remain.
The results seem to suggest that the market is semi-strong inefficient, and does not
fully respond to analyst recommendations (before transaction cost). Although market
inefficiencies exist, they are not readily exploitable for two reasons. Firstly,
transaction costs would erode most of the abnormal returns generated by active
investment strategies. Secondly, abnormal returns relative to the market are not
consistent in the short term. There are months where unfavourably recommended
stocks outperformed favourably recommended ones. These reasons allow
inefficiencies to persist. However, Barber et al (2001) suggests, despite the lack of
positive net returns to the strategies in this study, analyst recommendations should
remain valuable to investors who are otherwise considering trading. Investor would be
better off overweighting more favourable recommended stocks and underweighting
those with less favourable analyst ratings, all other things being equal.
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The results of this study are confined to the investment universe and investment
strategies under examination and do not rule out the existence of profitable investment
opportunities based on analyst recommendations. Whether other investment strategies
applying analyst recommendations in other ways, to a different investment universe
and/or time period would be able to yield significant net abnormal returns remains an
open question, which could be explored by future research.
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Appendix A: Table of Annotated References
Security Analyst Recommendation Literature
Author Reference Summary / Findings
Anand,
Badrinath,
Chakravarty, &
Wood, (2006)
Journal of Trading,
Fall 2006, 22-37.
The release of analyst recommendations enhances
liquidity. Spreads do not change while volume and
depth increase.
Ball, Brown &
Finn, (1978)
JASSA, 2, 5-10. Abnormal returns are found in the months leading up
to the announcement of the recommendations.
Smaller returns are recorded in the month of the
announcement, while little evidence of abnormal
returns is found in the post-recommendation period.
Barber, Lehavy,
McNichols, &
Trueman, (2001)
Journal of Finance,
56, 531−563.
Calendar-time trading strategies that long (short)
stocks with the most (least) favourable stock
recommendations yields abnormal returns of over
4%.p.a. However, net returns after transaction cost
are insignificant.
Barber Lehavy,
McNichols, &
Trueman, (2002)
The Social Science
Research Network.
A re-examination of the investment value of analyst
recommendations using calendar-time trading
strategy for 2000 and 2001 finds that the least
favourably recommended stock outperform the most
favourably recommended ones.
Barber, Lehavy,
& Trueman,
(2007)
Journal of
Financial
Economics, 85,
490−517
The market reaction to independent analysts' buy
recommendations exceeds the reaction to investment
bank analysts' buy recommendations, suggesting that
the market can de-bias the optimism in investment
bank analysts' recommendations.
Boni & Womack
(2002)
Brookings-Wharton
Papers on Financial
Services: 2002
Existing and potential investment banking
relationships influence analyst judgement.
Institutional investors are able to de-bias sell-side
analysts’ research results, to a certain extent with
internal research.
Brown (1993) International
Journal of
Forecasting 9
( 1993) 295-320
This paper provides a summary of the literature on
analyst earnings forecasting.
Choi, (2000) The Journal of
Financial and
Quantitative
Analysis, Vol. 35,
No. 3, 485 - 498
The investment advice encapsulated in the Value
Line Investment Surveys exhibits performance
beyond what is predicted by existing models of
expected return. However, abnormal profits after
transactions costs are insignificant.
Cowles, (1933) Econometrica 12, This paper assesses the stock selection and market
107
309-324 timing ability of security analysts and finds that on
average the recommendations issued by analysts
perform poorly against the market.
Cowles, A.,
(1944)
Econometrica, 12,
July. October,
206-214.
This paper re-examines the recommendations of 11
of the financial publications and find evidence of
more favourable performance compared to Cowles,
(1933).
Elton, Gruber &
Grossman (1986)
Journal of Finance,
XLI (3), July,
699-714
Firms that receive buy (sell) recommendations tend
to earn higher (lower) abnormal returns. Consensus
recommendations generally perform better than
individual ones.
Fabre & Snape,
(2007)
Working Paper Analyst recommendation revisions are found to be
liquidity enhancing events. The empirical results
indicate that bid-ask spreads do not change around
revisions, but depths and trading volume increase.
Finn (1984) In Contemporary
Studies in Economic
and Financial
Analysis, 44,
Chapter VII, JAI
Press Inc.
This paper examines the information content of
recommendations produced by the in-house analysts
of a financial institution. The price movements of the
stocks are consistent with the direction of the
recommendations. The most significant evidence of
abnormal returns is found in the first month after a
recommendation.
Green, (2003) The Social Science
Research Network.
Early access to stock recommendations provides
investors with incremental investment value.
Abnormal profit after transaction costs is significant.
A calendar-time strategy produces annualized returns
of over 30%.
Irvine, (2003) Journal of
Corporate Finance
9, 431-451
The market responds more positively to analysts’
initiations than to other recommendations. Both price
and liquidity of the stock increases.
Jaffe & Mahoney,
(1999)
Journal of Financial
Economics, 53,
289-307.
Stocks recommended in investment newsletters do
not on average outperform the market. The
performance of individual investment newsletters
exhibits some persistency.
Jegadeesh, &
Kim (2006)
Journal of
Financial Markets 9
(2006) 274–309
Stock prices react significantly to recommendation
revisions in all G7 countries except Italy. The largest
price reactions around recommendation revisions and
the largest post-revision price drifts happen in the
US.
Jegadeesh, Kim,
Krische, Lee,
(2004)
Journal of Finance,
59, 1083–1124.
Stocks favourably recommended by the analysts, on
average, outperform stocks unfavourably
recommended by them. However, there is a bias for
analysts from sell-side firms to recommend
“glamour” stocks, which may affect investment
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returns.
Li, (2005) Journal of
Accounting and
Economics 40,
129–152
Analysts with above-median risk-adjusted
performance in the estimation period persistently
outperform those with below-median performance in
the subsequent holdout period.
Lin, &
McNichols,
(1998)
Journal of
Accounting and
Economics 25, 101–
127
Recommendations of underwriter analysts are more
optimistic than that of unassociated analysts.
Investors respond similarly to favourable
recommendations, but more negatively to hold
recommendations from underwriter analysts.
Michaely, &
Womack, (1999)
Review of Financial
Studies 12, 653–686
Buy recommendations from underwriter analysts
underperform buy recommendations from
unassociated analysts, suggesting bias in underwriter
analysts’ research. The market does not fully
recognize the extent of the bias.
Mikhail, Walther,
& Willis (2004)
Journal of
Financial
Economics 74,
67–91
Analysts’ recommendations exhibit persistency in
performance. Excess returns following the revision
are positively associated with analysts’ prior
performance. However, a trading strategy taking long
(short) positions in recommendation upgrades
(downgrades) conditional on analysts’ performance is
not sufficiently profitable after transaction cost.
Ramnath, Rock &
Shane, (2008)
International
Journal of
Forecasting 24
(2008) 34–75
This paper develops a taxonomy of research
examining the role of financial analysts in capital
markets, based on the foundation provided by
Schipper (1991) and Brown (1993).
Schipper (1991) Accounting
Horizons; Dec
1991; 5, 4
This paper provides a summary of the results of prior
literature on analyst earnings forecasts, decision
process and incentives.
Stickel, (1995) Financial Analysts
Journal 51, 25–39
The magnitude of price impact from
recommendation changes is positively related to the
strength of the recommendation, the magnitude of
change, the reputation of the analyst, and the
marketing ability of the brokerage. The effect of the
analyst recommendations also depends on the
information environment, and whether
contemporaneous earnings revisions are being
released.
Womack, (1996) Journal of Finance
51, 137–167
Large share price reactions are recorded at the time
of the recommendations, even though few
recommendations coincide with new events or
provide previously unavailable information.
Post-recommendation stock price drifts are found to
last up to one month for upgrades and six months for
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downgrades.
Black-Litterman Model Literature
Author Reference Summary
Black &
Litterman (1992)
Financial Analysts
Journal,
September–October,
pp. 28–43
This paper introduces the Black-Litterman Global
Optimization Model.
Da &
Jagannathan
(2005)
Teaching Note on
Black-Litterman
Model
MBA teaching note (Kellogg School of Business) on
the excel modelling and implementation of the
Black-Litterman Model.
Drobetz (2001) Financial Markets
and Portfolio
Management
Volume 15, PP.
59-75
Provides an intuitive guide and examples to the
Black-Litterman Model.
He & Litterman
(1999)
Goldman Sachs
Investment
Management
Research.
Explains the underlying intuition with the
Black-Litterman Model.
Idzorek (2004) Working Paper Provides and detailed step-by-step guide to the
implementation of the Black-Litterman Model, with
a focus of how to incorporate investor views.
Malloch &
O’Shea (2008)
Next Financial
Research Paper
Explains the basic math and derivation from the
mean-variance optimization to the Black-Litterman
Model.
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Appendix B: Monthly Raw Returns and Market Adjusted Returns of Portfolios
Using Different Execution Assumptions
Consensus Portfolios from 30/6/1997 to 31/10/2002
Period Rebalancing Execution Portfolio
Monthly Raw
Return
Monthly Market
Adjusted Return
Consensus
1997-2002 Daily cls 1 1.022% 0.298%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 1 1.035% 0.013%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 1 0.956% 0.240%
1997-2002 Daily cls 2 0.918% 0.194%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 2 0.935% -0.087%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 2 0.897% 0.180%
1997-2002 Daily cls 3 -0.365% -1.089%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 3 -0.447% -1.468%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 3 -0.648% -1.365%
Monthly Rebalancing
1997-2002 Monthly cls 1 1.150% 0.426%
1997-2002 Monthly vwap 1 1.159% 0.138%
1997-2002 Monthly bisi 1 1.144% 0.428%
1997-2002 Monthly cls 2 0.814% 0.090%
1997-2002 Monthly vwap 2 0.806% -0.216%
1997-2002 Monthly bisi 2 0.792% 0.076%
1997-2002 Monthly cls 3 -0.303% -1.027%
1997-2002 Monthly vwap 3 -0.222% -1.244%
1997-2002 Monthly bisi 3 -0.429% -1.145%
45 Days Cut-off
1997-2002 Daily cls 1 1.138% 0.414%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 1 1.306% 0.582%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 1 1.093% 0.376%
1997-2002 Daily cls 2 0.455% -0.269%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 2 0.444% -0.280%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 2 0.295% -0.421%
1997-2002 Daily cls 3 0.250% -0.474%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 3 0.157% -0.566%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 3 -0.047% -0.764%
103 Days Cut-Off
1997-2002 Daily cls 1 0.642% -0.082%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 1 0.817% 0.093%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 1 0.629% -0.087%
1997-2002 Daily cls 2 1.187% 0.463%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 2 1.106% 0.382%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 2 1.056% 0.340%
1997-2002 Daily cls 3 -0.477% -1.201%
1997-2002 Daily vwap 3 -0.485% -1.209%
1997-2002 Daily bisi 3 -0.685% -1.402%
111
Appendix B: Consensus Portfolios from 31/10/2002 to 30/10/2007
Period Rebalancing Execution Portfolio
Monthly Raw
Return
Monthly Market
Adjusted Return
Consensus
2002-2007 Daily cls 1 1.612% 0.097%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 1 1.620% 0.132%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 1 1.614% 0.127%
2002-2007 Daily cls 2 1.607% 0.092%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 2 1.556% 0.067%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 2 1.547% 0.061%
2002-2007 Daily cls 3 0.535% -0.980%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 3 0.570% -0.919%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 3 0.486% -1.001%
Monthly Rebalancing
2002-2007 Monthly cls 1 1.568% 0.053%
2002-2007 Monthly vwap 1 1.525% 0.036%
2002-2007 Monthly bisi 1 1.501% 0.014%
2002-2007 Monthly cls 2 1.575% 0.060%
2002-2007 Monthly vwap 2 1.564% 0.075%
2002-2007 Monthly bisi 2 1.558% 0.071%
2002-2007 Monthly cls 3 0.759% -0.756%
2002-2007 Monthly vwap 3 0.792% -0.697%
2002-2007 Monthly bisi 3 0.752% -0.735%
45 Days Cut-off
2002-2007 Daily cls 1 1.566% 0.051%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 1 1.501% 0.012%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 1 1.397% -0.090%
2002-2007 Daily cls 2 1.747% 0.232%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 2 1.803% 0.314%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 2 1.650% 0.163%
2002-2007 Daily cls 3 1.124% -0.391%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 3 1.038% -0.450%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 3 0.942% -0.545%
103 Days Cut-Off
2002-2007 Daily cls 1 2.415% 0.900%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 1 2.388% 0.899%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 1 2.379% 0.892%
2002-2007 Daily cls 2 1.613% 0.098%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 2 1.584% 0.095%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 2 1.569% 0.082%
2002-2007 Daily cls 3 1.090% -0.425%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 3 0.926% -0.563%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 3 0.936% -0.551%
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Appendix B: Black-Litterman Portfolios
Period Rebalancing Execution Shrinkage
Monthly Raw
Return
Monthly Market
Adjusted Return
Black-Litterman (default)
2002-2007 Daily cls 0.1 tau 2.160% 0.645%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 0.1 tau 2.150% 0.662%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 0.1 tau 2.103% 0.616%
2002-2007 Daily cls 0.01 tau 1.606% 0.092%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 0.01 tau 1.582% 0.093%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 0.01 tau 1.576% 0.089%
2002-2007 Daily cls 0.05 tau 1.862% 0.347%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 0.05 tau 1.843% 0.354%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 0.05 tau 1.818% 0.332%
2002-2007 Monthly cls 0.05 tau 1.709% 0.194%
2002-2007 Monthly vwap 0.05 tau 1.684% 0.196%
2002-2007 Monthly bisi 0.05 tau 1.682% 0.196%
Black-Litterman 45 Days Cut-off
2002-2007 Daily cls 0.05 tau 1.701% 0.186%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 0.05 tau 1.710% 0.221%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 0.05 tau 1.640% 0.153%
Black-Litterman 103 Days Cut-off
2002-2007 Daily cls 0.05 tau 1.876% 0.361%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 0.05 tau 1.781% 0.293%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 0.05 tau 1.712% 0.225%
Black-Litterman with Dynamic Views
2002-2007 Daily cls 0.05 tau 1.416% -0.099%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 0.05 tau 1.358% -0.131%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 0.05 tau 1.223% -0.264%
Black-Litterman with Static Confidence
2002-2007 Daily cls 0.05 tau 1.583% 0.069%
2002-2007 Daily vwap 0.05 tau 1.550% 0.061%
2002-2007 Daily bisi 0.05 tau 1.554% 0.067%
